

CURRENT History

FEBRUARY, 1968

VOL. 54, NO. 318

In this issue six specialists discuss Africa's continuing search for unity and stability. Examining the events surrounding the 1967 Nigerian civil war, our first author states that "Eventually, by coercion or conciliation, hostilities will be ended, but the welcome return of peace will not end Nigeria's troubles. Territorial integrity may have been preserved, but national unity will be as remote as ever."

Nigeria At War

BY JOHN D. CHICK

Lecturer in Political Science, Makerere University College, Uganda

ALL AFRICAN STATES contain ethno-cultural groups whose divergent interests and ambitions strain the delicate apparatus of national unity. Nigeria's difficulties in this respect are by no means unique, but her size and social complexity make her ethnic fragmentation particularly acute. At no time did the federal institutions with which the country achieved independence in 1960 succeed in maintaining more than an illusion of stability. As the

political system lurched from crisis to crisis, the balance between the competing blocs became ever more precarious, until the regime finally succumbed to military intervention in January, 1966.¹

The reasons for the collapse of civilian rule and for the swift descent into civil war defy brief analysis, but the major source of stress was relatively simple. Whereas economic development and modernization had progressed further in the South, the poorer and more traditionalistic North held a predominant position politically by virtue of its larger population.² This initial advantage was used by Northern leaders to entrench themselves in power and to extend their influence at the expense of the Southern parties, whose rivalries prevented them from agreeing on effective counter-measures.

The January, 1966, coup was ambiguous. It resulted in part from a puritanical desire to cleanse public life, an aim which gained widespread support among a population increasingly alienated from a corrupt and ineffective political elite. At the same time it contained

¹ A good introduction to the tensions dividing Nigeria is Walter Schwarz, "Tribalism and Politics in Nigeria," *The World Today*, November, 1966, while a fuller discussion is provided by Richard L. Idar and C. S. Whitaker, "The Federal Republic of Nigeria," in Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966). The most comprehensive treatment of developments from independence to the beginning of 1966 is to be found in John P. Mackintosh, *et al.*, *Nigerian Government and Politics* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966).

² According to the 1963 census, the North had 29.8 million inhabitants, while the three regions of the South—the West, Mid-West and East—had a combined total of 25 million. These figures are suspect, but the relative levels are probably approximately correct.

traces of a Southern (primarily Ibo) backlash against Northern hegemony and exacerbated ethnic rivalries which threatened to escalate to catastrophic levels. However consciously this end may have been sought by its architects, the political initiative passed into Southern hands: a counter-coup in July was largely an outcome of the North's determination to regain control of the situation.³

The North-South conflict was symbolized by the uncertain status of Ibos scattered throughout the Northern Region. Their Southern education enabled them to fill a disproportionate number of the posts demanding literacy and manual skills, a fact which exposed them to the resentment of their neighbors. Living under the strain of constant insecurity, they tended to react with exaggerated exclusiveness and even truculence, so that communal antipathy always simmered on the edge of violence. The 1953 riots in Kano had resulted in 36 deaths and revealed the potential for wholesale slaughter in many Northern cities. Blatant provocation was common on both sides. Given the mounting tension of 1966, an explosion was virtually inevitable.

In May that explosion came, followed by further disturbances in September and October. Hundreds of helpless Ibo citizens were massacred by rampaging mobs, and thousands of others, abandoning their jobs and possessions, fled in confusion back to their homeland in the East. The influx of refugees posed major problems of resettlement in an area which was already one of the most densely populated in Africa, and the stories of atrocities created an atmosphere of claustrophobic fear.

Easterners had always been suspicious of what was sometimes termed "Sokoto imperial-

ism";⁴ now their misgivings appeared to be justified. The military governor of the East, Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, expressed the opinion that the ground was being prepared for "the conquest by the North to the sea," and students at the Eastern Region's university spoke of an intention to "overrun and annihilate" the Ibo.⁵

ABURI AND AFTER

Thus, at the beginning of 1967, the East was sunk in an isolation which was both physical and psychological. Ibos continued to work outside the Region, particularly in the Mid-West and the federal capital of Lagos, but most regarded their future as uncertain and many took steps to repatriate their families. At government level, contact was maintained with the Eastern authorities, but negotiations were complicated by the reluctance of leaders, including Ojukwu himself, to venture away from their own tribal area. The fact that Northern troops had joined civilians in the killings of the previous October gave some credence to the claim that federal control over the security forces was tenuous, and that the safety of delegates to constitutional talks could not be guaranteed.

At this stage the chances of salvaging the federation appeared to be slight, but the New Year, 1967, brought one promising development. Following an invitation from General Joseph Ankrah, the chairman of Ghana's National Liberation Council, members of the Supreme Military Council gathered for two days of discussions at Aburi, a few miles north of Accra, in Ghana. Personal confrontation, and the security of neutral territory, produced a cordial atmosphere and a substantial measure of agreement.

The meeting condemned the bloodshed of the previous year, renounced force as a means of arbitrating regional differences, and reaffirmed its faith in Nigeria as a political unit. The need for increased regional autonomy was accepted, but it was felt that a satisfactory solution could be worked out on the basis of the pre-coup constitution. The Council also agreed that resettlement of refugees should be a joint responsibility and that those

³ For a full discussion of the events of 1966, see W. A. E. Skurnik, "Nigeria in Crisis," *Current History*, March, 1967.

⁴ Sokoto was the pre-colonial capital of the Islamic, Hausa-Fulani ethno-cultural complex which dominated the North.

⁵ Radio Enugu, December 15, 1966, and December 1, 1966, quoted in *Africa Research Bulletin*, January, 1967. Most of the material upon which this article is based is drawn from the *Research Bulletin* (Exeter) or from the weekly *West Africa* (London).

who had fled from posts in government departments and statutory corporations during the disturbances should have their salaries paid in full up to the end of March, 1967.

Unfortunately the euphoric spirit of Aburi did not long survive the return to the grim realities of Nigeria. The supreme commander, Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Yakubu Gowon, found that his advisers in Lagos felt that he had gone too far towards meeting Eastern demands for protective decentralization. This prompted him to announce that he remained committed to the maintenance of effective central authority, so arousing the fears of the devolutionists by seeking to allay the fears of the federalists. Moreover, he was told that his promise of continued salary payments was prohibitively expensive.

The federal authorities did not abandon their pledge to honor the Aburi agreement, but Ojukwu charged them with stalling on its implementation and, with some justification, rejected the argument that the reasons for the delay were purely technical. He became increasingly convinced that he had been betrayed, and threatened to enforce the agreement unilaterally unless it were put into effect by the end of March. His words reflected the growing conviction that Ibos were facing a challenge, not merely to their interests, but to their very existence:

... it is not our intention to be slaughtered in our beds. We are ready to defend our homeland; we are prepared to crush any aggressor. Fellow-countrymen and women, on Aburi we stand. There can be no compromise. . . .⁶

On March 17 the Supreme Military Council, meeting without the Eastern leader, issued Decree Number 8, which decentralized authority to the Regional Governors, giving each of them a veto on some subjects. This step might have reassured the East in January, but relationships had deteriorated to such a point that this was no longer considered enough. Thus, at the end of March, Ojukwu seized all federal revenues accruing in his Region. Although the Council responded by imposing economic sanctions, its approach

during the following weeks tended to be conciliatory. Nonetheless, repeated overtures met with little response.

By reserving his position, Ojukwu may have hoped to achieve a settlement more favorable to the East, but it seems likely that all possibility of negotiation had by this time passed. There was no immediate prospect that Northerners and Easterners could work harmoniously together on a basis of trust, and economically the Region stood to lose more than it would gain by remaining within Nigeria. Absorption of refugees would create difficulties, but these would have to be faced inside or outside the federation and, while secession might mean the end of some sources of revenue (Northern crops railed through Port Harcourt, for example), the Region's rapidly developing oil production would no longer have to subsidize the expensive superstructure of federal control. This calculation of advantage was based on pessimistic assumptions.

There was reason to hope that the East's withdrawal would lead to the crumbling of the edifice of national unity and the creation of a series of smaller states with which functional cooperation might be possible.

Certainly events during May, 1967, cast doubts on the ability of the central government to survive an open confrontation, let alone to undertake decisive military action against a rebellious regime. When meetings of "leaders of thought" were held in each Region to discuss the country's future, only the Northern assembly stood firmly behind Gowon, while both the West and Mid-West showed signs of weakening. The latter, situated between the East and concentrations of federal troops in Lagos, and conscious of the large Ibo minority within its borders, saw that it might become a battleground and pressed for the loosening of federal ties in order to avoid the possibility of civil war. The West, led by the Yoruba veteran of the nationalist movement, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, spoke ominously of the possibility of its own independence should the East succeed in leaving the federation.

Western leaders had memories of Northern domination which were just as painful as

⁶ Radio Enugu, February 25, 1967.

those of the East. They accepted the fact that Gowon (who, although a Northerner by birth, came from a minority tribe) was working for national reconciliation, but were suspicious of the extent to which he might be swayed by the "old guard" of the Hausa-Fulani establishment. In particular they resented the continued presence of Northern forces on their soil. At first Gowon claimed that these were essential for the maintenance of security until a crash training program had produced enough local replacements, but he finally gave way and withdrew the troops across the border.

THE NEW STATES

This concession rallied wavering support, which was consolidated by the proclamation of a State of Emergency on May 27, and by the announcement that the country was to be divided into 12 states. The latter move, which had been discussed for many years as a possible method of rectifying Nigeria's dangerous regional imbalance, was ostensibly designed to convince the East that the power of the North had been finally broken; it was also intended to reassure Gowon's allies, and to weaken Ojukwu in the event of an attempted secession.

As the smallest existing unit, the Mid-West was left intact, while the West lost some territory to the new Lagos State—an innovation which it had resisted in the past, but which made sense administratively and which did not involve any really major threat to its interests.⁷

Six states were created in the Northern Region, a step welcomed by minorities in the riverain provinces which had long desired greater autonomy. Since the institutional changes necessitated by such a radical reform were very complex, overall control was to be vested in a Council for the Northern States

during the transitional period. This Council was regarded in the East as a device to maintain the reality of centralized authority while going through the motions of decentralization. In any case, it was argued that even if the decree were conscientiously applied, the traditional cohesion of the Upper North would transcend artificial divisions and enable it to remain a dominant force in the federation.

As far as Eastern critics of the proposals were concerned, however, the most contentious provisions were those relating to their own Region, which was to be split into three. It is true that separatist movements had been growing in the area for some years, but to most observers the new boundaries appeared to have been drawn with the deliberate intention of striking at the interests of the majority. Not only was the predominantly Ibo East-Central State denied access to the sea, but it lost the oil deposits upon which rested its hopes for future development.⁸

Ojukwu's reaction was swift. On May 30, he declared the entire Eastern Region independent as the Republic of Biafra and unfurled a new tricolor flag: green for progress, black for mourning and red for blood.


THE WAR

Secession did not lead to an immediate outbreak of hostilities. For several weeks the country drifted in an uneasy peace. Biafran claims of a minor clash near Obudu in mid-June were denied by Radio Nigeria and it began to seem as though the declaration of independence had presented the regime in Lagos with a *fait accompli* which it was powerless to reverse. Then, following a border incident in July, central government troops launched what was euphemistically described as a "police action" against the breakaway Region.

The focal point of the attack was Biafra's capital, Enugu. Approached by columns from the north and east and—after the port of Bonny had fallen to seaborne invasion—threatened from the south as well, Enugu was soon effectively encircled. However, hopes of a rapid victory were quickly dashed. The

⁷ Previously Lagos had been designated "federal territory," while some of its suburbs and satellite villages lay in the West—an arrangement which made overall control of urban development extremely difficult.

⁸ The East had produced 65.4 per cent of the federation's oil in 1966; only 2.8 per cent came from the territory of the proposed East-Central State.



—Reprinted by permission from *The Christian Science Monitor*. © 1967
by The Christian Science Publishing Society. All rights reserved.

NIGERIA

army achieved moderate success in the outlying, non-Ibo areas, occupying towns like Ogoja with little disruption of civilian life. But once the tribal heartland had been reached, resistance became far more bitter. Virtually the entire population rallied in defense of its homeland and, when defeat became inevitable, the Ibos left the advancing troops in possession of deserted houses and the remains of the dead.

Only once did the battle appear to turn in Biafra's favor. In August, the Mid-Western governor was forced to flee his capital following a mutiny instigated by Ibo officers. Simultaneously, Biafran forces made a coordinated crossing of the Niger and seized Benin. The impetus of their advance carried the leading units into the boundaries of the Western Region, where they represented a threat to Ibadan, and even to Lagos. Ojukwu commented that his aim was now "to help liberate any part of Nigeria from the domination of the North."⁹

Eastern leaders cannot seriously have believed that extensive conquests were possible. They probably felt that a really decisive blow would serve a dual purpose, relieving pressure on the other fronts and shaking the unity of the federal government, thus permitting negotiations to open from a position of strength. This hope was not realized. The Ibos' sudden dash to the west meant that their supply lines were stretched thinly over territory whose inhabitants resented the Ibo takeover and the visitation upon them of a war in which they desired no part. Even the rulers of the newly "liberated" Republic of Benin wavered in their loyalty to Ojukwu. The fronts in the East held firm, and the central forces, rallying at the town of Ore, pushed the invading troops back to the river.

The rebels did gain minor successes. Federal losses were heavy in the delta area to the south where combat conditions were particularly difficult, and premature attempts to pursue the retreating units across the Niger into the major commercial center of Onitsha produced many casualties. The general pic-

ture, however, was of Ibo soldiers and civilians being squeezed into an ever smaller area by a remorseless war of attrition. Nsukka, the scene of prolonged fighting, fell in July, and Enugu was itself evacuated in October.

Although the latter had been the primary target of the federal action, its capitulation was of symbolic rather than military significance. Largely a product of colonial administration and the exploitation of local coal deposits, it did not represent a focus of traditional loyalty. Enugu's loss was a serious blow to Biafra's pretensions to statehood, but the main Ibo strength lay in small towns, villages and rural areas, which were as resolute as ever. Their defenders were fortified by the sincere belief that surrender meant certain death. When they admitted their defeats, they explained them away by seeking out scapegoats whose treachery was supposed to account for their reverses. It became clear that, unless a political solution were found, every inch of territory would have to be won by the federal government in the face of fanatical Ibo opposition, making extensive bloodshed inevitable and leaving a legacy of corrosive hatred.

WORLD REACTIONS

Biafra did not achieve official recognition from any quarter, although she went to considerable pains to win world sympathy.

African nations were uneasily aware of the decline in their prestige that resulted from endemic instability: a fratricidal war fought in one of the continent's most newsworthy states was bound to attract adverse publicity, strengthening in their self-righteousness the white regimes to the south. In addition, most leaders, however much they may have appreciated the merits of the Biafran case, were conscious of the fissiparous tendencies in their own countries and would not condone political fragmentation for fear of initiating a chain reaction.

The Western bloc also favored Nigeria's federal government, although Western governments were reluctant to give any concrete expression to their support. The United States placed an embargo on the sale of arms

⁹ *West Africa*, August 19, 1967.

to Nigeria, while Britain would authorize the supply of only minor items of equipment. Not surprisingly, the central authorities were infuriated by this refusal to provide them with the means to discipline Ojukwu, especially since it was widely known that Biafra was continuing to receive supplies from unofficial Western sources. They suspected that their traditional allies were anxious to do nothing that might embarrass the oil companies working in the East, until it was clear which side was going to win. Initially, this may have been a real consideration, but once it was obvious that secession would fail, the policy of the West did not serve the best interests of the oil companies, whose main preoccupation was with a rapid end to the hostilities. The basis of the policy of the West seems to have been the hope that, deprived of weapons, both sides would fight to a standstill and come to terms without a physical occupation of Iboland. This optimism proved unfounded, and it could be argued that a lightning victory with outside assistance might have been preferable on humanitarian grounds.

Eventually, Lagos acquired arms from the Soviet bloc. It is doubtful whether these significantly affected the outcome of the war, but they represented a minor triumph for Russian foreign policy in an area in which its previous experience had not been particularly happy.

As the battle dragged on, concern over the plight of the Ibos became more marked. The Biafran claim that Biafra was bearing the standard of Christianity and Western liberalism against the combined forces of militant Islam and international communism gained little serious support, but sympathy for the myopic heroism of the embattled population was widespread. In the confused fighting,

the federal authorities tried to restrain their troops, there can be no doubt that incidents of gratuitous violence added to the terror. Central government forecasts that resistance would quickly collapse were disproved by events, and the prospect of a prolonged siege raised the specter of famine and epidemic disease.

Informed opinion, inside and outside Africa, became convinced that a negotiated peace was necessary to avoid further tragedy. Unfortunately, all external initiatives foundered on the federal government's insistence that there was nothing to discuss except the terms of the rebels' surrender, and on the rebels' determination to die for their cause. Typical was the experience of the consultative committee which visited Lagos on behalf of the Organization of African Unity. Originally scheduled to make the trip immediately following the Kinshasa summit meeting in September, it eventually arrived late in November, with only four of its six members, after a series of delays had underlined the fact that Gowon did not welcome its intervention.¹¹

FORMIDABLE OBSTACLES

Biafra's bid for statehood rose out of a combination of mass hysteria and miscalculation. Her leaders underestimated the resistance that their plans would meet within Nigeria and overestimated the support that would be forthcoming from external sources. By the time the vulnerability of their position became obvious, they were trapped in a policy that unleashed the very forces they had sought to contain. Fearing invasion, they in-

(Continued on page 113)

Following work for the Nigerian Ministry of Finance in Lagos and the Supreme Court in London, **John Chick** was lecturer in political science at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Northern Nigeria, from 1962 to 1966. At present he holds concurrent appointments as lecturer at the University of Manchester, England, and the University of East Africa, Uganda.

¹⁰ A federal spokesman estimated that approximately 50,000 lives were lost in the civil disturbances of 1966 and in the course of war prior to the fall of Enugu. (*West Africa*, October 7, 1967.)

¹¹ The members of the delegation were Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, General Joseph Ankrah of Ghana, President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroun and President Hamani Diori of Niger. Presidents William Tubman of Liberia and Joseph Mobutu of the Congo could not travel on the dates eventually arranged.

Describing the development of a "phantom coalition" to turn Southern Africa into a white fortress, this observer warns that "The longer the conflict [between white South Africans and non-whites] continues, the greater the danger that it will become an unadulterated race war, creating the gravest world-wide consequences."

Southern Africa: The White Fortress

BY KEITH IRVINE

Specialist in African Affairs

SINCE 1960, if not earlier, it has been clear that African nationalism and white intransigence are on a collision course in Southern Africa. Each side remains convinced that its own cause will ultimately prevail—yet both cannot be right. Today, while the final confrontation between the two is not yet at hand, the features of the coming conflict have become more marked.

Faced with the challenge of African nationalism at home, and with widespread disapprobation abroad, the governments of South Africa, of Portugal, and of secessionist Rhodesia are engaged in turning Southern Africa into a white fortress—a fortress which they are building to stand any siege, any attack, and any vicissitude, insofar as possible. To this end South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola have been linked together in what has been called a "phantom coalition"—a mutual aid grouping whose existence has not yet been fully acknowledged in public, although it is tacitly admitted. The coalition aims at economic self-sufficiency, is already functioning as a military entity, and has begun to immix itself in the internal affairs of independent African states to the north. Metropolitan Portugal, meanwhile, provides the coalition with a staging area in Europe itself.

The history of the establishment of white settlement in Southern Africa has passed through successive phases. Firstly, there was

the reconnoitering period, which began in the 1480's when the Portuguese, having already established bases in West Africa, discovered the Congo mouth and rounded the Cape of Good Hope. The second phase opened in the seventeenth century when the Dutch, having ousted the Portuguese from their principal West African strongholds, also took possession of the Cape in 1652. The third phase opened when the British, having seized the Cape from the Dutch during the Napoleonic wars, sent out the first English settlers in 1820.

In the years of British predominance that followed, the Dutch-descended Afrikaners, striving to maintain their own culture and form of religion, moved inland, establishing two self-governing Boer republics in the 1850's. In the 1890's—the high point of imperialism—adventurers of Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company went north into what became Rhodesia, establishing the town of Salisbury, and suppressing the African opposition against white settler rule which broke out in the Matabele and Mashona uprisings. Further British expansionism led eventually to the Boer War of 1899–1902, during which Britain incurred international moral censure, but overcame the Boer republics.

The South Africa Act of 1910, which established the Union of South Africa, was intended to lead to a merging of British and Boer cultures in a single new nation. The

deathblow to this experiment in cultural coexistence was struck by the 1948 electoral victory of the Afrikaaner Nationalist party. The policies introduced by the Nationalists moved South African society steadily in the direction of apartheid (separation of races, especially black from white), while at the same time asserting the predominance of Afrikaaner over English language and culture. Emphasis on these two themes finally led South Africa to become a republic and to leave the Commonwealth in 1961—one year after the fiftieth anniversary of the Union was celebrated in 1960.

SOUTH AFRICA

In examining the situation in each of the territories comprising Southern Africa's white coalition, it is natural to consider South Africa first, since she is the strongest member of the group, having by far the largest white population, and providing the other members with an industrial base.

The year 1960 was indeed a watershed in South African history. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of the United Kingdom, visiting South Africa in February of that year, warned the South African Parliament that "the wind of change is blowing through the continent," and urged that the growth of national consciousness in Africa be taken into account in framing national policies. In effect, in 1960, no less than 16 African states were to accede to independence and be admitted to United Nations membership. Plainly, barriers to a confrontation between African nationalism and South African apartheid were being rapidly dissolved.

South Africa's black majority was aware of these developments, and this awareness no doubt contributed to the psychological climate in which the tragic Sharpeville incident occurred. On March 21, 1960, at Sharpeville, South African police opened fire on Africans demonstrating against the pass laws, killing 66 and wounding hundreds more. World-

wide condemnation of South Africa's apartheid policies resulted, and the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution deploring the incident, and South African policies and actions. It was in this atmosphere that on April 9, 1960, an English-born South African farmer shot Prime Minister Henrik F. Verwoerd twice in the head, but failed to kill him. For a moment South African history—like Prime Minister Verwoerd's life—hung in the balance.

A mood of doubt and introspection swept over South Africa's white community. A state of emergency was declared. Between March 25 and April 14, South Africa's gold and foreign exchange reserves dropped by over \$36 million. The president of the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce urged the government to take a new approach to Africans, based on consultations. Other influential voices spoke in the same vein. In the weeks that followed, the decision-makers hesitated, and while they did so the crisis of July, 1960, burst upon the Congo with tropical suddenness. Instead of hesitating, white South Africa settled down to await the next turn of events—and to build her strength. Thus, by not deciding, the decision was in fact taken, and an opportunity to turn from the fatal collision course was lost. South Africa would uphold apartheid whatever the consequences.

Since 1960—the turning point which failed to turn—fortune has favored segregationist South Africa, at least for the time being.¹ The flowing tide of independence halted on the Zambezi. Serious internal troubles have plagued not only the Congo but also Nigeria, and a series of coups d'état have taken place in other African states. The possibility, which once seemed imminent, that African states would unite to launch a successful crusade against apartheid's southern bastion has now receded. Individual African governments usually have other problems that demand priority, however strongly they oppose the apartheid system. Moreover certain African states, such as Malawi and Botswana, lie so close to the fortress's shadow—Lesotho, for example is entirely embedded in South African territory, while Swaziland, the last of the

¹ An exception to the recent pattern was the assassination of Prime Minister Verwoerd in September, 1966, by a parliamentary messenger—an event that sent a tremor through white South African society.

old High Commission territories, due for independence in 1968, is in almost the same position—that their relations with it are not those of declared hostility, but rather approach those of a qualified dependency.

Whether they may best be described as “buffer states” or “client states,” they nevertheless occasionally incur the disapproval of some African nationalists who, situated some distance north of Africa’s putative “Mason-Dixon line,” do not appreciate the extent to which the geopolitical situation is dominant. Much depends upon style, however, and some criticism may stem from the fact that whereas some degree of cooperation with white South Africa may be necessary, it need not be enthusiastically accorded, as it has been on occasion by Malawi, for example.

Militarily, South Africa also finds herself in a better stance than she did at the time of Sharpeville. Budget estimates for defense expenditure, for example, have risen from about \$61 million for the financial year 1960–1961 to \$358 million for 1967–1968—practically a sixfold increase. Much emphasis has been laid upon the manufacture of munitions, budget provision for which has increased over a hundredfold since 1960. As a result, South Africa is now self-sufficient in the production of small-arms and ammunition, and has announced that she can now also export arms. Her air force is also being rapidly expanded; she has a navy of 35 ships; and she is soon to acquire submarines. Furthermore it was reported in March, 1967, that South Africa had acquired the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons. This statement is supported by a recent press report² that West German scientists are helping South Africa to build nuclear reactors and are also working on the development of Harp missiles at a rocket station in Tsumeb, South West Africa. These facts may be the basis for dark statements by South African officials about new weapons

which—one claimed—could dispose of a would-be attacker “before breakfast.”

Economically, too, South Africa has waxed stronger since 1960. Her population was then just over 16 million, but according to the South African Bureau of Statistics, it has increased to 18,733,000, although 12,750,000 of these are Africans, and only 3,563,000 whites (1,859,000 more are Colored, and 561,000 are Asians). South Africa’s imports, which amounted to \$1.566 billion in 1960, rose to \$2.3 billion in 1966, while the 1960 export figure of \$1.233 billion had risen by 1966 to \$1.684 billion. Industry is also growing stronger—the assembly of all types of vehicles has, for example, greatly increased—and the country’s gold holdings that were valued at \$178 million in 1960, by September, 1967, stood at \$487 million.

Despite the U.N.-backed strictures against trading with South Africa—for example, the U.N. has appealed to states to “discourage immediately the establishment of closer economic and financial relations with South Africa, particularly in investment and trade”³—the economy is clearly not at the point of collapse. Indeed, on the contrary, investment from abroad has increased substantially since the days of Sharpeville. Britain is the principal foreign investor, followed by the United States. The two countries, between them, accounted in 1965 for 76 per cent of total investment in South Africa. Although United States investment amounted to only 12 per cent of the total, and to only 1.1 per cent of all United States investments abroad, United States private investment in South Africa rose from \$286 million in 1960 to \$528 million in 1965. West Germany, Japan, Italy, France and Switzerland are other countries which have shown no signs of heeding the United Nation’s appeal aimed at discouraging economic relations with South Africa.

Events elsewhere have also favored white South Africa, and only in part because these events have dimmed the glare of publicity which once played upon the only state in the world openly to champion racial discrimination. One sign of this was the fact that when 36 South West Africans were placed on trial

² *Washington Post*, November 3, 1967. The report also stated that despite West German denials, South Africa had supplied West Germany with possibly 100 tons of impure uranium oxide, which had been enriched in the United States before delivery to the nuclear reactor at Guntremmingen.

³ See U.S. General Assembly Resolution 2202 (XXI) of December 16, 1966.

in Pretoria in 1967—a trial of the most questionable legality, in which the accused faced possible death—many organizations and media which would otherwise have drawn public attention to the trial were so preoccupied with the war in Vietnam, reports of massacres in Nigeria, and the plight of refugees in the Middle East, that they did not do so. Recent riots in United States cities, similarly, have diverted American attention from events in Southern Africa to interracial problems at home.

In practical terms, also, South Africa has benefited from disturbances elsewhere. After the closing of the Suez Canal during the Middle East war of June, 1967, the number of vessels using South African ports substantially increased, with over 800 ships bunkering in them between June and November alone. At the same time, Western naval authorities began to attach increased strategic significance to the Cape route, thus underlining the practical advantages to Western governments of maintaining friendly relations with the Republic of South Africa.

Nor is this all. On two other issues on which she formerly felt vulnerable, South Africa has also now acquired a greater sense of security. First, South Africa in the past was caused considerable embarrassment as a result of her treatment of her Asian minority population, many of whom are of Indian or Pakistani origin. Jawaharlal Nehru's India was particularly active in spearheading an international campaign to pressure South Africa to change her racial policies. Today, Nehru and his international reputation are both memories, while India herself is riven by grave internal difficulties that inhibit her from making unusual external efforts.

Second, South Africa had long dreaded the possibility that the International Court of Justice would eventually hand down a mandatory ruling on the status of South West Africa that would deprive South Africa of her legal basis for controlling the territory. When, after considerable delay, and the delivering of various advisory opinions, the

Court at last made its decision known, the judgment proved, in effect, to be a victory for South Africa. It held that Ethiopia and Liberia, who had brought the case against South Africa, had no standing in the matter.⁴ Since that time, there has been no thought of further legal action by the African states, and South Africa is proceeding to take steps plainly designed to hasten the eventual incorporation of South West Africa as another province of the republic itself. It is true that the United Nations, backed by the United States, has declared the League of Nations' mandate over South West to be at an end, and the United Nations has itself set up a council to administer the territory. Yet the council reported, in November, 1967, that South Africa's refusal to cooperate made it impossible for the council to discharge its functions. The next move is clearly up to the United Nations Security Council. However, South Africa appears to believe that the United Nations and all its organs—councils, committees, boards and assemblies—do not constitute any immediate threat to her control over South West Africa. In 1960, the South African government was afraid of what the United Nations might do. In 1968, rightly or wrongly, it is not.

ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

Three territories—Angola, Rhodesia, and Mozambique—constitute the effective outworks of the white fortress, since their northern frontiers border those of the independent African states. Two of the three, Angola, to the northwest of South Africa, and Mozambique, to the northeast, are ruled by Portugal. In both territories (as also, indeed, in Portuguese Guinea to the north of the Equator), the Portuguese army has been at war with African nationalist guerrilla movements, since 1961 in Angola, and since 1964 in Mozambique.

Both territories, according to the United Nations (which voted on their status in 1960) are "non-self-governing territories"—which is to say, Portuguese colonies. According to Lisbon, however (which for centuries persisted proudly in simply calling its overseas posses-

⁴ See Keith Highet, "The South West Africa Cases," *Current History*, March, 1967, p. 154.

sions "The Conquests"), they are now integral parts of Portugal—that is to say, provinces which happen to be situated overseas. Angola is the larger of the two, having an area of 481,350 square miles, compared to Mozambique's 302,250 square miles. Mozambique, however, has the larger population—6,578,000 at the 1960 census (6,430,000 Africans; 97,000 whites; 31,000 mixed; 19,000 Asian)—compared to Angola's 4,830,000 (4,604,000 Africans; 172,000 whites; and 53,000 mixed).

Like Mozambique, Angola is still primarily an agricultural country, although mining is becoming increasingly important. Almost half the value of Angola's exports in 1965 came from her coffee crop. Rising income from minerals comes from diamonds, petroleum and iron ore. High grade deposits of offshore oil have recently been found by the Gulf Oil Corporation in the shallow waters off Cabinda—a Portuguese enclave just to the north of Angola and the Congo mouth. As a result, Portugal expects to be self-sufficient in petroleum by the end of 1970, and the possibility that the United Nations can apply pressure on South Africa's white coalition by means of an oil boycott will be rendered more problematical. In Mozambique, industrial and mining activity is negligible. The main agricultural crops are cotton, cashew, sisal, and copra. Mozambique has had, however, an unfavorable balance of foreign trade, and her economy has been injured by the British and United Nations boycott of Rhodesia, for which the port of Beira in Mozambique is the main outlet.

It is, however, paradoxical that Angola and Mozambique should often be referred to as dependencies of Portugal, for in effect it would be more true to say that Portugal is dependent upon them. Small and backward Portugal, geographically, has her back turned to Europe. According to reports from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Portuguese working class is the poorest on the continent. If the Portuguese government were to lose its African colonies, it would be deprived of the only rewarding destiny it can at the moment visualize for the country. It is not insignificant,

however, that many individual Portuguese do choose other destinies. It is reported, for example, that of the 130,000 Portuguese who emigrated in 1965, barely 10,000 chose to go to the African colonies. The remainder preferred to settle in Brazil, France or Germany.

To maintain her colonial mission, Portugal is finding, moreover, that she must pay a price, and pay it in instalments on a rising scale. Since fighting against African nationalists in Angola intensified in 1966, Portugal has had a total of at least 120,000 troops overseas, and has had to increase the term of compulsory military service from two to three years, a period which is also extendable up to four years. By 1967, Portugal's defense expenditure amounted to over 40 per cent of her total public expenditure. The warfare, however, shows no signs of diminishing. It has been particularly troublesome to the Portuguese in the east of Angola, where the conflict has led to clashes inside neighboring territories, and in the northern parts of Mozambique, where the Portuguese have, *inter alia*, tried unsuccessfully to stabilize the situation by resettling a quarter of a million people.

In Angola, the Portuguese report that they are fighting against three separate African nationalist organizations—Holden Roberto's G.R.A.E., Augustino Neto's M.P.L.A., and Jonathan Savimbi's U.N.I.T.A. In Mozambique, meanwhile, they face two more, one of which, FRELIMO, led by Eduardo Mondlane, has gained several successes. Disturbed and frustrated by a conflict that seems to have no end, and which is attracting widespread international criticism, Portugal has apparently sought to counterattack by supporting internal strife in the Congo and Nigeria—a reaction that is not winning her any popularity in some Western policy-making circles, where the aim is to stabilize conditions in some of the more politically volatile African countries, rather than to exacerbate them.


RHODESIA

Rhodesia lies uneasily between Mozambique and Botswana, guarding, as it were, the northern central rampart of the South African fortress. Historically she was the creation

of the man whose name she bears — Cecil Rhodes—and her destiny is marked by his personality. Rhodes was an avowed imperialist, and entertained gigantic dreams. Force and chicanery were his weapons, and while they brought him personal success, when he attempted to use them in affairs of state he created a catastrophe in his lifetime, and left the whole of Southern Africa with a disastrous heritage of hatred. His famous statement about “equal rights for all civilized men” has given color to the myth that he was a statesman. But this was an easy statement to make in his day, when Central Africa had barely emerged from the Livingstone and Stanley era and had no political significance, except to give Rhodes an unjustified reputation for liberalism among persons far from the scene. His true opinions—and they had political significance, especially as he acted on the basis of them—were expressed in a less publicized declaration of his: “I prefer land to niggers.” Rhodes also made much of his devotion to the British Empire. But in point of fact he did not hesitate to threaten to break with the Crown and proceed on his own, when London showed doubts about the advisability of his aggressive schemes. And he appears to have sought to use the Empire for his own ends, while propagating the myth that he was its great and faithful servant.

It is therefore entirely appropriate that the territory which still bears his name (the African name for it is “Zimbabwe”) should have adopted a Land Apportionment Act that reserves half of Rhodesia for the use of the white minority numbering 220,000, leaving the remainder to the four million Africans.⁵ It is also fitting that Rhodes’ spiritual heirs, proclaiming devotion to the British Crown and invoking the spirit of George Washington in the same breath, should have chosen to secede from Britain out of convictions which owe little to the influence of either American de-

⁵ In South Africa herself, the disproportion is greater: 87 per cent of the country is reserved for the white minority, 19 per cent of the total population, whereas the remaining 13 per cent of the land—usually the least desirable—is reserved for the use of the majority. South Africa’s “Bantustan” policy of separate development has, consequently, not even the virtues of the “separate but equal” doctrine.



—Reprinted by permission from *The Christian Science Monitor*. © 1967 by The Christian Science Publishing Society. All rights reserved.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

mocracy or British justice. Something of Rhodes’ approach is also to be found in the insistence of Rhodesia’s secessionist leader, Ian Smith, in referring to his policy as one of “separate development,” never apartheid.

Rhodesia (then Southern Rhodesia) was the base for the ill-fated attempt, begun in 1953, to impose white minority rule on the African populations of neighboring Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia), and Malawi (then Nyasaland), as well as on Rhodesia’s Africans, under the name of the Central African Federation. After the Federation was finally dissolved, Britain attempted to persuade Rhodesian settlers to make some token gestures in the direction of the concept of eventual majority rule. But the emotional strain on the white minority was too great, and in November, 1965, Rhodesia declared her secession

(Continued on page 111)

Keith Irvine, a specialist in African affairs, has over the past decade contributed articles to a wide variety of publications. He was formerly editor of *Africa Today* and *Africa Weekly*.

Evaluating the progress of Emperor Selassie's regime, this observer indicates that Ethiopia's pace and range of development have so far been limited, nonetheless, "pressures for change indicate that Ethiopia's political pulse is quickening, and the years ahead may prove the most challenging. . . ."

Ethiopia: The Quickening Pulse

BY WILLIAM H. LEWIS

Associate Professor of Political Science, George Washington University

NO SINGLE 30-YEAR PERIOD in Ethiopian history can compare with the more than three decades since the coronation of Haile Selassie as Emperor. At the time of his ascension, Ethiopia was a little known mountain empire insulated from the mainstream of world history. Her diverse peoples were ruled under a baronial system reminiscent of Elizabethan England; communications were tenuous; and awareness of the outside world was fragmentary and distorted.

In a sense, Ethiopia's progress bears some resemblance to that of the Roman Empire. Polybius, the Greek historian who made Rome his chief place of residence, noted the spread of Roman hegemony with the following observation: "Practically the whole inhabited world, in less than 53 years, was mastered and fell under the sole administration of Rome—the like of which, it will be found, has never happened before."

Ethiopia also is a conquest empire, drawn together in the last 75 years as a result of the military prowess of the now dominant Amhara ethnic minority. Until the coronation of Selassie, the martial tendency was pervasive. But, as in ancient Rome, Amhara military victories did not come without interruption. Under the stewardship of Benito Mussolini, modern Rome exercised its dominion over Ethiopia from 1936 until World War II. Nor has this been the only attempt to dismantle the empire.

Early in 1967, Ethiopia appeared beleaguered on all sides. Within the lowland Oga-den region, restive Somali tribesmen continued to register their dissatisfaction with Amhara domination. Their brethren in the neighboring Somali Republic lent more than tacit support to an effort to reunite all Somalis under one national standard. The situation along the disputed Ethiopian-Somali frontier was tense, and a recrudescence of conflict similar to that which erupted in 1963-1964 appeared in prospect.

Somali irredentism was making itself felt elsewhere in northeastern Africa as well. Insurgency had erupted in the former Northern Frontier Province of Kenya, where 290,000 Somali tribesmen followed traditional pastoral pursuits. The fabric of Kenyan-Somali relations had become so frayed that in mid-1966 Nairobi broke all ties, including diplomatic relations, with Mogadiscio.

Even the isolated enclave of French Somaliland (C.F.S.) did not escape irredentist turbulence. A visit by French President Charles de Gaulle to the Somaliland capital of Djibouti in August, 1966, was greeted with widespread rioting by Somali nationalists; the Somalis accounted for somewhat less than half of the territory's population of 120,000. Initially bewildered and ultimately angered, de Gaulle offered the C.F.S. an opportunity to decide its future in a territory-wide referendum. The offer produced an outcry from a wholly

unexpected quarter—Ethiopia. Heavily dependent upon the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad for more than 50 per cent of her export trade, Ethiopia protested the offer and hinted darkly that the termination of French colonial rule would not be accepted with equanimity.

As the C.F.S. prepared for the promised referendum in March, 1967, tension mounted throughout the Horn. Tough French paratroopers and legionnaires were rushed into Djibouti; thousands of “non-resident” Somalis were expelled from the territory; all demonstrations were banned in the capital city. Propaganda salvos were repeatedly fired from Mogadiscio and several days prior to the vote a number of Somali troops were moved into the northern districts. Ethiopia countered with her own forces and Armageddon seemed at hand. However, saner counsels prevailed in Addis Ababa and Mogadiscio. The “recourse to the urns” resulted in a substantial vote by the numerically superior Afar tribesmen in favor of retention of C.F.S. ties with France.

The crisis in Djibouti was subsequently overshadowed by difficulties in the northernmost Ethiopian province of Eritrea. An Italian possession for almost half a century, Eritrea had been attached to Ethiopia in 1952 under the auspices of the United Nations. Eritrea enjoyed special status: she was appended in a federal relationship, having her own constitution, legislative assembly and chief executive. However, in 1962, her assembly voted to terminate the territory’s special relationship and integrate without benefit of special privilege. This action was ill-received by a large proportion of Eritrea’s Muslim community, which accounts for approximately 50 per cent of the territorial population. The level of tension rose perceptibly as refractory Muslims organized a dissident movement, the Eritrean Liberation Front (E.L.F.), which mounted a guerrilla campaign against the extension of Ethiopian authority. The Eritrean lowlands today are a zone of insurgency in which secessionist impulses are expressed in terror raids and acts of outright brigandage. The fact that E.L.F. elements are receiving financial and other

support from several Arab states has heightened Amhara anxieties concerning the tentacular nature of Islamic expansionism.

SIGNS OF DETENTE

Despite wide-ranging incompatibilities, some efforts have recently been launched by various leaders in the region to establish a basis for mutual accommodation. The estrangement of recent years has largely been relieved by a reduction of Somali irredentist pressures. The signal for this reduction was the election of Ibrahim Egal as Somali prime minister in July, 1967. A moderate statesman of scholarly temperament, Egal placed the quietus on Mogadiscio’s campaign to “liberate” Somali tribesmen in neighboring areas. Indeed, he has staked his own tenure on the success he registers in achieving Somali objectives through diplomatic means.

Egal’s campaign for normalizing relations was launched in a preinvestiture speech on August 9, 1967, when he affirmed his determination to “influence alien rulers of Somali territories to grant Somalis the right of self-determination,” while indicating that he did not “covet any territory belonging to Ethiopia or Kenya.” To underscore his sincerity, Egal muted the propaganda organs of Mogadiscio, curtailed the activities of Somali exile groups in the capital, and ended the flow of government assistance to insurgent groups in Kenya. The first opportunity for a diplomatic confrontation materialized during the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) summit conference at Kinshasa in mid-September, 1967. Two fruitful meetings were held with Emperor Haile Selassie. Less than a week later, a delegation from Somalia, led by Yasin Nur Hassan, the minister of interior, sojourned to Addis Ababa to discuss the Ogaden question. Both sides were apparently reassured by the talks and announced plans to meet at Mogadiscio in the near future.

The Kinshasa summit also produced momentum, under the auspices of Zambia’s President Kenneth Kaunda, for a reconciliation between Somalia and Kenya. To set the stage for their confrontation, Kenya’s President Jomo Kenyatta announced a one-month

amnesty for Somali *shiita* (insurgents) in Kenya's northern border region. Subsequently, a meeting was convened in Meru, Tanzania, with both sides evincing a clear desire to end their quarrels.

These auspicious beginnings may produce a new period of calm in the African Horn. Thus far, the omens have all been reassuring. However, a considerable residue of mutual suspicion remains. A small faction within the Somali National Assembly has already attacked attempts at reconciliation on the grounds that the Egal government has made the principal concessions thus far, with virtually no indication that Somali political objectives will be attained. While Egal has the full support of President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, he confronts a delicate situation at home: (1) Somali's dominant national party—the Somali Youth League (S.Y.L.)—is an amalgam of competing tribal factions, held together by a complex series of delicate compromises and arrangements; (2) tribal groups that overlap the frontiers could well defect from the S.Y.L. or, more likely, seek to seize control of its leadership should they come to oppose Egal's conciliatory approach; (3) exile groups in Mogadiscio also retain a certain capacity for political maneuver should the government continue to oppose filibustering expeditions into Ethiopia and Kenya; (4) the Somali army, which has hitherto served as a shield for government support of exile and insurgent groups, may grow impatient with the present policy of moderation.

Prime Minister Egal's prospects for bringing his present initiatives to a successful conclusion will depend greatly upon his ability to achieve the following: he will have to secure concessions from both Kenya and Ethiopia concerning the "right" of Somali pastoralists to utilize grazing lands and water holes in their territory with as few restrictions as possible; he will also have to elicit assurances that the position of resident Somalis in both countries will be "regularized"—this means, at minimum, the early removal of certain security restrictions that redound to the disadvantage of local Somalis; ultimately, and infinitely more difficult of achievement, he may

have to extract assurances from his neighbors that they will grant their Somali populations the "right of self-determination" concerning their future loyalties and political attachments. While prediction is always a hazardous undertaking in Africa, there can be little doubt that the latter concession will be extremely difficult to extract from governments that rule a medley of diverse ethnic and tribal communities. For once the right to opt out is granted, the forces of balkanization will enjoy respectability and a substantial measure of legitimacy.

RECENT ETHIOPIAN GAINS

The peoples of Ethiopia have frequently been described as a "motley assemblage," a museum of ethnic communities, languages and religions. Embracing a land area about twice the size of France, Ethiopia encompasses approximately 20 million inhabitants. In addition to the ruling Amhara ethnic minority, themselves a highland people of schismatic Christian persuasion, the country incorporates *inter alia* their Gurage "kinsmen," Galla cattle-herders, who are partially Amharized and partially animistic, and diverse Muslim groups like the Danakil, Somalis, and people of the great walled city of Harar.

To the extent that historical continuity exists, it has been the Amharas who have provided Ethiopia with some semblance of cohesion and coherence. Their recent subjugation of other subnational peoples places upon them the burden of forging links that are likely to be more enduring than those predicated upon conquest and coercion. In brief, what has confronted Emperor Haile Selassie has been the need to devise effective means for harnessing Ethiopia's divergent societies in the struggle to create a viable national community.

The problems confronting the Emperor have been as complex as the tapestry of Ethiopian societies. The absence of consensus on the definition of political goals, together with a comparable degree of disagreement on national priorities to be established, have impeded efforts at "political development." The ethnic component in these efforts has re-

quired particular definition. For instance, to what extent should Amhara culture be the guidepost for other cultural groups? Is Amhara society sufficiently resilient to absorb the changes that are involved in modernization? What type of political order is likely to prove enduring in the face of change? What "mix" of centralized power and decentralized authority will suffice to generate local initiative? What is the proper role of the new elites in the devolution of responsibility?

While the questions are legion, the cultural and historical background against which responses have been fashioned has occasionally proved bewildering to the foreign observer. Rather than lurching headlong into decisions, the Emperor has preferred to test local sentiment and to proceed cautiously. Throughout his lengthy reign he has governed in an authoritarian manner, benevolently on the whole but harshly where necessary. Political parties are not permitted to function; trade unions remain in an embryonic state of development; the press is closely monitored.

However, it must be recognized that Ethiopia's political environment and her 500 years of turbulent history have dictated a policy of personal rule and prudence. The Emperor has been constrained as much by circumstances as by his own proclivities to build a strong personal base of political power. This base could only be predicated initially upon loyalty from the Amhara notables and the Christian clergy. Only when assured of their backing has he been able to institute the dual process of extending Amhara hegemony from the center while slowly transforming political institutions to permit newly emerging elites to play a middle role in the decision-making processes.

Despite the painstakingly slow pace with which new political institutions have been brought into existence, the results have been impressive on the whole. A revised constitution, personally promulgated by the Emperor in 1955, afforded Ethiopians an opportunity to elect representatives to the lower house in a bicameral legislature; both chambers are permitted to scrutinize and pass on legislation; they may also request the presence of royal

ministers to question them on government policies, plans and programs. For his part, the prime minister has been delegated increased powers and responsibilities in the day-to-day management of government business by the Emperor.

Notable progress has been registered in other fields as well. Many isolated sections have been opened as a result of the construction of more than 3,000 miles of paved roads; Ethiopian Airlines now provides service to every large community within the country, and offers international connections to Europe, the Middle East and Africa; modern trucking firms have established networks throughout the country. Finally, in the field of education, an entire generation of Western-trained university graduates, numbering in excess of 15,000, is to be found in the middle echelons of the bureaucracy, army, and business community. The Emperor himself has taken over the portfolio of the minister of education.

GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT

Thus far, the Ethiopian approach has been pragmatic, eclectic and gradualistic. A modern economic, social and bureaucratic sector has sprung into existence. However, it is not numerically large; power is not highly concentrated within it, nor is it representative of Ethiopian society as a whole. According to some estimates, approximately 75 per cent of the officers within the 38,000-man army are Amharas, 60 per cent of ministerial portfolios are held by Amharas, and the ruling ethnic group predominates in the middle and upper levels of the civil bureaucracy. Thus, the non-Amhara majority would appear not to have been the primary beneficiary of the Emperor's largesse.

The reasons for the slow pace and narrow range of development are attributable to the inherently narrow loyalties of subnational groupings, the tenacity of their traditional value systems, and the restricted resource base from which the present leadership has been compelled to operate. Until recently, Ethiopia has lacked the administrative and technical manpower needed to shape up the modern

sector. Trade and commerce have been dominated by non-Ethiopians. In the rural areas, where more than 80 per cent of the population lives, local cadres needed to guide economic development have been unavailable. As a result, efforts to increase per capita productivity, expand rural credit, improve marketing and distribution systems, and conduct cadastral surveys have all been impaired. In large measure, the emergent elites have preferred service in the capital to assignment in the provinces. The gap between themselves and the broad mass of Ethiopian society has tended to grow commensurate with their virtual monopolization of the rewards of modern life.

However, as Ethiopia's non-elites have come to perceive how national resources are being allocated they have increasingly sought to strengthen their claims upon these same resources. Thus, the Gurage people in Addis Ababa have organized their own labor amalgam. Galla army officers have sought to create their own ethnic-cultural association. Eritrean Christians have also lobbied vigorously for a large share of government grants. Elsewhere, traditional groups have expressed their needs in traditional ways—through increased banditry, episodic outbreaks of insurgency and other forms of defiance. Whatever the means of expression, all these pressures for change indicate that Ethiopia's political pulse is quickening, and the years ahead may prove the most challenging to the present generation of leaders.

ETHIOPIA'S AFRICAN VOCATION

The path that Ethiopia will follow over the next few years will have a considerable impact upon the rest of independent Africa. Within recent years, Addis Ababa has become the Geneva of the continent. The seat of the Organization of Africa Unity, formed in Addis Ababa in May, 1963, Ethiopia is the headquarters for a number of other international organizations. Even more significant, however, has been the role of moderator and conciliator played by Emperor Haile Selassie himself. One of the principal architects of the O.A.U., he was instrumental in bringing to an

end the radical-moderate cleavage (represented by the so-called Casablanca and Monrovia groupings in 1961–1963) that had blunted efforts at inter-regional cooperation.

Not to be discounted, in addition, have been the Ethiopian contributions to the dampening of crises between African states, and Ethiopia's role in intrastate conflict situations. Ethiopia provided a substantial contingent of troops to the United Nations peacekeeping effort in the Congo during 1960–1961; within recent months, a small air component was made available to the government of Congolese President Joseph Mobutu at the height of its difficulties with European mercenaries. The Emperor also acted as peacemaker after hostilities erupted between Morocco and Algeria over several disputed oases in the Sahara in October, 1963. His interventions have proved equally helpful in quarrels between Guinea and the Ivory Coast, Ghana and Dahomey, and the Congo (Kinshasa) and the U.A.R. Most recently, Haile Selassie served as a member of an O.A.U.-sponsored peace mission dispatched to Lagos to bring an end to the civil war that crystallized in the attempts of Biafra to secede from the Nigerian Federation.

These peacekeeping activities represent a signal contribution to African stability. The Emperor's interventions carry considerable diplomatic weight because of his preeminence as a founder of the O.A.U. Even more significant, however, is the respect and admiration that most African leaders hold for a monarch whose period of rule spans two generations and who has met and overcome all challenges to his authority. Moreover, in his

(Continued on page 114)

William H. Lewis served as a visiting professor in Middle Eastern and African studies at the University of Michigan during the 1965–1966 academic year, and is the editor and co-author of *New Forces in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1962), *Emerging Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964) and *French-speaking Africa: The Search for Identity* (New York: Walker & Co., 1965).

Despite . . . unpleasant side effects of the mutiny [in the Congo], this specialist notes that "the Mobutu regime, by the time of the celebration of its second anniversary, . . . had given proof of its resiliency, weathered crises any one of which would probably have shipwrecked its predecessors, reestablished the Congo's position on the African diplomatic scene and received proof of soft-spoken but steady United States support in its hour of need."

Consolidation in the Congo

By EDOUARD BUSTIN

Associate Professor of Government, Boston University

ONE DAY when Louis XVIII was on the throne of France, a young and doubtless malicious lady asked the aging author of *An Essay on Privilege*, "But what did you do under the Empire, Monsieur Siéyès?" To which the old abbé replied simply, with a wry smile: "I survived." Much the same could be said of the Mobutu regime in the Congo during the second year of its existence and, as in the case of the old revolutionary, this mere statement of fact summed up a not inconsiderable achievement.

The Joseph Mobutu government opened its second year in power with a major crisis on its hands. This was the conflict with the largest mining corporation in the Congo, *Union Minière*. The roots of this confrontation were analyzed in the pages of this journal several months ago¹ and there is no need to return to them at this time. Tension between the Congo government and Belgian interests had been escalating throughout most of 1966, and the decision formally to divest the *Union Minière* of all its mining concessions in favor of a new, government-controlled corporation (the *Société Générale Congolaise des Minerais*, more commonly referred to as GECOMIN) merely represented the visible, procedural enactment of a break

which the two parties had rendered virtually inevitable.

To what extent either side had actually intended the conflict to reach such an impasse as that of early 1967 is impossible to determine. But the fact remains that after the *Union Minière* had openly made it clear that it would refuse to comply with Congolese corporate and fiscal legislation, and after the Kinshasa government had resolved to enforce the statutory penalties provided for such violations, both sides found themselves committed to positions from which they could not retreat without at least a serious loss of face. At the same time, both the Congo and Belgian interests suffered from the stalemate, and the crisis rapidly came to revolve around the question of which side was the more vulnerable.

That the question could be raised at all was in itself an indirect testimony to the Mobutu regime's relative strength—or, perhaps more accurately, to its ability to stress the lack of political alternatives to its own existence. Times were when the mere thought of a conflict between the Kinshasa authorities and Belgium's leading bank, the all-powerful *Société Générale*—let alone the outcome of such a conflict—would not even suffer discussion. Now, however, Belgian interests were no longer inclined to dismiss Mobutu's moves as tactical demagoguery intended

¹ See my article, "Confrontation in the Congo," in *Current History*, March, 1967.

solely for domestic consumption, and they were sufficiently alarmed to call upon their not inconsiderable influence within the Belgian political system and within the international business world. Within the latter circles, certain appetites (notably those of groups linked with the Rothschild Frères interests) had been whetted by the prospect of a dismembering of the *Union Minière's* Katanga empire, and some amount of firm talk on the part of Belgian interests appears to have been needed to dissuade interested parties against taking advantage of the *Union Minière's* temporary discomfiture.

Yet, if the *Union Minière's* behavior appeared somewhat jittery, there was no doubt that the Congo, for its part, remained highly vulnerable to various forms of Belgian retaliation. Kinshasa, which had apparently not anticipated a trial of strength with Belgian corporate interests, had no contingency plans to counter the threatened withdrawal of expatriate personnel beyond some nebulous notion of hiring Japanese technicians or the impractical thought of retaining Belgian personnel in the Congo against their will. The Congolese authorities also discovered that the *Union Minière* and related interests were in a position to close effectively all marketing possibilities for Katanga minerals in the non-Communist world. Finally, the loss of revenue resulting from the suspension of Katanga mining operations threatened the Congo treasury with swift suffocation.

FACE-SAVING COMPROMISE


It was hardly surprising, therefore, that when a truce was quietly arranged between the two antagonists, the substance of its terms was, on the whole, more favorable to Belgian interests than to the Mobutu regime, while outside appearances were designed to satisfy Kinshasa's sensitivity. According to this interim compromise, the voiding of *Union Minière* concessions, as well as their attribution to the state-controlled GECOMIN—both resulting from an act of state on the part of the Congo government—were maintained.

² This trend was analyzed in my previously cited article.

But the actual management and development of the concessions were farmed out not to the *Union Minière* but to the *Société Générale des Minerais* (S.G.M.), a Belgian corporation controlled (like the *Union Minière*) by the *Société Générale* bank which had in the past been the sole processing and marketing agent for all Katanga minerals. The largely fictitious character of this reshuffle was further stressed by the specification that S.G.M.—rather than GECOMIN—would also take over the employment of all expatriate personnel.

Such a compromise, however, favorable though it was to Belgian interests and Congolese national pride, did not amount to a definitive settlement of mutual claims, nor did it assuage each party's suspicions of the other's ulterior designs. No real détente between Kinshasa and Brussels followed the truce: President Mobutu continued to deplore the anachronistic obduracy of the "three hundred old gentlemen" of Brussels in terms similar to those used, in other circumstances, to decry "les 200 familles" or "the gnomes of Zurich," while the largely conservative Belgian press continued to aim its daily quota of barbs at the Congolese government.

If the immediate material benefits reaped by the Mobutu regime at the outcome of its confrontation with Belgian interest groups turned out to be somewhat illusory, the rewards in terms of political prestige were not negligible. In order to assess them, it may be useful to remember that Mobutu's initial decision to assert the Congo's right of control over alien interests had been motivated to a considerable extent by his determination to establish his credentials as a genuine Congolese nationalist and possibly to cast himself in the role of a new Lumumba. It is probably impossible—and indeed, irrelevant—to determine the exact proportion of sincerity and opportunism that entered into the making of this political option in early 1966,² but there is little doubt that, whatever its other by-products may have been, the *Union Minière* earned for Mobutu the somewhat grudging admiration of many nationalistically-minded Congolese (particularly members of the in-



—Map by Russell Lenz reprinted by permission from *The Christian Science Monitor*.
© 1967 by the Christian Science Publishing Society. All rights reserved.

THE CONGO

tellectual elite) who had had serious reservations about his regime.

At the same time, if we assume (as it seems fair to assume) that Mobutu's decision to adopt a militantly nationalistic stance was motivated, at least in part, by his desire to base his regime on a deeper and broader foundation than that offered by the army, it is interesting to note that the actual policies he followed to implement this decision had, in turn, the effect of reinforcing the "civilian," if not necessarily the democratic, character of the

regime. In crisis after crisis that rocked the regime in the first two years of its existence, Mobutu reacted by appealing to popular emotions and by attempting to mobilize nationalist militancy. Even when military intervention was called for (as during the 1966 and 1967 mutinies) the very fact that the army's loyalty was somewhat less than monolithic led the President to rely increasingly on a civilian entourage.

In the long run, of course, the survival capacity of any military regime always de-

depends on the quality of the military's adjustment to its civilian environment. In the Congo, this process began almost immediately after the November, 1965, coup and has been going on ever since. One of Mobutu's early preoccupations, one that only came to full fruition in 1967, was to firm up the legal and institutional bases of the regime. Before this could be accomplished, however, the sequels of earlier crises had to be liquidated. In March, approximately at the same time as the *Union Minière* crisis was being resolved in the manner previously described, death sentences were passed against two leaders of the 1966 military uprising at Kisangani and severe prison terms were given to five other participants in the conspiracy, including the brother of former Prime Minister Moïse Tshombe. As for Tshombe himself—in whose name the call to mutiny had been raised—he was sentenced to death *in absentia*, possibly as a warning to those foreign interests who might have considered engineering a second comeback for their protégé. If such was Mobutu's intention, the warning appears to have gone unheeded as preparation for a new pro-Tshombe coup apparently went on throughout the spring of 1967.

A NEW DRAFT CONSTITUTION

In the meantime, however, sweeping changes were being made in the country's constitution, administrative structure, party system, labor organization and monetary base. Several of these changes, of course, were merely formal or reflected *de facto* situations that had existed for some time, but the regime's aspirations toward systematic mutation was unmistakable. A new draft constitution (the third since 1960) was published in April, 1967, and dutifully ratified by the Congolese people in a June referendum that may be said to have been neither more nor less honest or meaningful than such consultations ever are in Africa.

The new constitution formalized the trans-

formation of the Congolese polity into a presidential system—a condition which had existed in fact since Lieutenant General Mobutu had decided to combine the functions of President and Prime Minister following the 1966 dismissal of General Leonard Mulamba from the premiership. It also provided for a unicameral parliament, a choice which underscored the regime's decision to abandon the semi-federal system of the 1964 constitution. The tendency toward a recentralization of the Congo's provinces had already manifested itself shortly after the military takeover when the number of provinces had been reduced from 21 to 12 and provincial governors had been brought under central government authority. The trend continued in 1967 and the number of provinces was further reduced to eight, thus returning almost to the administrative divisions of six provinces created by the Belgians in 1933. Indeed, only two ethnically cohesive areas where particularism had always been strong—the BaKingo and Kasai BaLuba regions—were allowed to retain an autonomous existence as the provinces of Lower Congo and East Kasai, respectively.³ Under the new constitution, provincial governors were explicitly regarded as representatives of the central government.

In a unique, if somewhat puzzling, section, the constitution also provided for the existence of "no more than two" political parties. On paper, at least, such a provision left the door open to the *de facto* establishment of a single-party system, a possibility specifically excluded by the previous constitution. In fact, however, all political parties in the Congo had long since collapsed and all attempts to reorganize them after 1963 had either fizzled out as a result of intimidation by the oligarchic power structure or (when such attempts were made by the oligarchy itself, as in the case of Tshombe's CONACO) had rapidly resulted in a diffuse, unstructured, quasi-monopolistic formation.

As the 1967 constitutional draft was being made public, President Mobutu announced the formation of a political party under his leadership. The *Mouvement Populaire de*

³ In fact, in the case of Eastern Kasai, the BaLuba areas were lumped together with the former Lomami province, the chief ethnic group of which are the BaSongye.

la Révolution (M.P.R.), as it was designated, was openly organized to support Mobutu's policies and absorbed the *Corps des Volontaires de la République* (C.V.R.), an earlier, partly unsuccessful attempt to mobilize the restless urban youth into a militant, though loosely-structured, non-party. The M.P.R.'s program, as it emerged from the party's founding conference in early May, confirmed the regime's already apparent tendency to combine verbal radicalism with operational moderation and to offer outlets for the emotional expression of nationalistic sentiment without cutting itself off from Western support. The M.P.R. proclaimed its intention to follow "a middle road between capitalism and communism" and to maintain "positive neutralism" in foreign affairs.

While Mobutu's desire to caste the M.P.R. net as widely as possible was certainly understandable and indeed legitimate, his attitude toward the organization of an opposition party (which the constitution authorized, if somewhat ambiguously) was indicative of his preoccupations. The regime's growing desire and need to develop popular support had led it as early as the spring of 1966 to draw, somewhat gingerly, on the memory of Patrice Lumumba for its ideological inspiration. Mobutu's increasingly obvious determination to appropriate Lumumba's political heritage now came into full view, not only in the government's decision to build a grandiose monument to the Congo's first prime minister (in whose liquidation Mobutu himself had played a not inconsiderable part), but also in its opposition to the reorganization of Lumumba's party, the M.N.C., on the grounds that "Lumumba's policy is now being carried out by Mobutu and his own party, the M.P.R." This determination on the part of the regime to define the terrain on which the opposition would be allowed to fight has understandably discouraged potential leaders of a second party and, accordingly, the M.P.R. has continued in the role of a *de facto* single party, which obviously does not mean that all internal resis-

tance to the Mobutu regime has disappeared.

The mutation of the Mobutu regime was completed in late June, 1967, when the government announced a spectacular devaluation of the Congolese currency and, simultaneously, replaced the monetary unit system by a new one based on the *Zaire* (ancient name of the Congo River), equivalent to 1,000 old Congo francs and valued at \$2.00.⁴

Apart from the psychological device (analogous to that used by Antoine Pinay in 1958 when the "new" or "heavy" French franc was introduced) of using a larger currency denomination for a monetary unit, the whole operation, backed by a \$27-million standby credit from the International Monetary Fund, was an attempt to do away with the wide gap between the official and unofficial exchange rates for the Congolese franc by pulling the former down to a level virtually equivalent to that of the latter—a drop of 65 per cent. In order to offset some of the effects of this devaluation for wage earners, salaries were raised by 25 per cent and later by another 15 per cent, but since in fact retail prices had long been based on the "black market" exchange rate (despite the government's efforts to impose pricing regulations), the repercussion of the devaluation on the actual standards of living was relatively limited.

Nevertheless, the business community's tendency to keep one jump ahead of the public, as well as the problems of adjusting to the new consumer goods import program that accompanied the devaluation, resulted in sufficient distortions in the price structure for the urban dwellers to experience some unpleasant side effects of the monetary reform. Organized labor, which might have been expected to take an unfavorable view of the devaluation and which had in the past made life difficult for Congolese leaders, remained largely passive—possibly due to the fact that the country's three major unions had been more or less willingly merged into a single organization more closely controlled by the government shortly before the devaluation.

CONSPIRACY

While the Mobutu regime was undergoing

⁴ The *Zaire* is divided into 100 *makuta* (pl.). One *likuta* is divided into 100 *sengi*.

this process of reorganization and consolidation, ominous signs of an impending crisis were gathering from all sides. On the basis of the number of abstentions and opposing votes in the June referendum, the suspected existence of fairly extensive disaffection from the regime in the Lower Congo area (former President Joseph Kasavubu's home base) and in some sections of Katanga could be inferred. But the truly alarming symptoms concerned the persistent rumors of an imminent coup designed to bring Tshombe back to power. Such rumors had been rife for some time, and they had of course proved to be founded in the summer of 1966 when Katanga units of the army had mutinied at Kisangani. Similar rumors had also been part of the tense climate that surrounded the confrontation with the *Union Minière*, and they had never wholly subsided after that.

Apart from the recruitment of mercenaries (for which hard evidence is always difficult to come by), concrete proof of an impending coup came in mid-June with the deliberate sabotaging of some Katanga rail and power lines. Then, as the Congo prepared to celebrate the seventh anniversary of its independence, came the bizarre news that Tshombe's plane had been hijacked while on a flight to the Balearic Islands and forced to land in Algeria, and that all its passengers had been interned by the Algerian authorities. Kinshasa immediately demanded the former premier's extradition. While the Houari Boumedienne government, visibly perplexed by the whole imbroglio in which it had apparently played no part, pondered its reply, the long-awaited attempt to unseat Mobutu broke out (July 5) in the form of a mutiny by Katangese troops and white mercenaries in the selfsame city of Kisangani where a similar episode had taken place almost exactly a year earlier. Simultaneously, insurrection flared out on a smaller scale in the two eastern towns of Bukavu and Kindu.

If there were a strong element of *déjà vu* in the 1967 mutiny, subsequent developments were to alter this early pattern. Within eight days of the outbreak, Kisangani was recaptured, thanks in part to the prompt dispatch

by the United States government of three C-130 transport plants which airlifted Congolese National Army forces to the capital of the Eastern Province. The mutineers, led by a Belgian adventurer named Jean Schramme, embarked on a long southeastward march which took them across Maniema, and then on to the Congo-Rwanda border, where they seized the border city of Bukavu (the capital of Kivu province). Once in control of Bukavu, and assured of an easy retreat as long as they could keep access to the three bridges leading into Rwanda, they settled down for a siege, having seized vast quantities of supplies and ammunition from the demoralized Congolese army. By doing so, they managed to immobilize more than half of the Congolese army, presumably hoping to unman governmental defenses in other parts of the country in anticipation of a second attack by pro-Tshombe forces striking from Angola.

The government, expecting just such a strike in Katanga and/or the Lower Congo, maintained forces in those two areas. In planning its moves, it could also count on the increased mobility afforded by the stand-by offer of United States air transport. At the same time, a combination of factors (including appreciably strong United States pressure on Portugal) delayed the opening of such a second front, and by the time a small Tshombist commando unit entered Katanga from Angola, the Bukavu mutineers were being forced to withdraw to Rwanda, where they were disarmed and interned. The diversionary strike against Katanga, in turn, was easily disposed of, and there remained only the thorny diplomatic problem of what to do with the mutineers—black and white.

If the Congolese army's victory over the mutineers was not so swift or decisive as might have been wished in Kinshasa, the Mobutu regime could at least derive indirect satisfaction from the insurgents' complete political fiasco. Upon capturing Bukavu, Colonel Léonard Monga, commanding the Katanga regiment, had announced the formation of a "Government of Public Safety," grandly changed to "Provisional Government of Liberated Congo" six days later. But it

soon appeared that the real authority in Bukavu was that of the white mercenaries—and particularly of their leader, Jean Schramme, whose political views were, to put it mildly, unlikely to appeal to an African audience. What Schramme's rudimentary political blueprint amounted to, as his remarkably candid interviews with Belgian newsmen revealed, was the establishment of a Congolese government of whites and blacks, the latter preferably required to be "men such as Tshombe." As for the Congolese army, it would be replaced under the command of white officers.

Tshombe's own political ideas (or those of his entourage) had been more subtly phrased, but since the former premier, pending a decision on his fate, continued to be held in custody by the Algerian authorities (possibly to the secret gratification of the Mobutu regime), his influence on the insurrection was minimal. In any case, the effect of Tshombe's absence from the political scene during these crucial months appears to have been oblivion rather than canonization. Even during the rebels' brief incursion into Katanga, the appeal of Tshombe's name, invoked by the mercenaries, turned out to be largely ineffectual. As a result, the former premier's credibility as a potential alternative to Mobutu suffered.

SUCCESS FOR MOBUTU

Another windfall from the insurrection was the sympathy it earned for the regime in virtually all capitals of the Third World, and particularly in Africa. The notoriously prominent role played by white soldiers of fortune in the mutiny and its sequels, as well as its racist overtones, brought out assurances of unflinching, though mostly verbal, support from all major African capitals. Algeria's willingness to oblige Kinshasa by detaining Tshombe (despite that militant country's res-

ervations about Mobutu) is a good illustration of this. As a result, Mobutu's persistent policy of ending the diplomatic isolation which had plagued Tshombe's regime scored another major success. This achievement was stressed by the holding in Kinshasa of the fourth summit conference of the Organization of African Unity in September. While the conference itself may not have been an outstanding success from the viewpoint of African preoccupations and interests, the fact that it was held in the Congolese capital while Bukavu was still under siege amounted to a tacit expression of confidence in the legitimacy and viability of the Mobutu regime.

On the other hand, relations with Belgium, which had already begun to deteriorate in 1966 when Mobutu challenged the terms of Tshombe's settlement of Belgo-Congolese claims, now took a decided turn for the worse. The number of Belgians in the ranks of the mercenaries,⁵ the involvement of some Belgian civilians in subversive activities and the blatantly anti-Mobutu tone of the Belgian press led to violent manifestations of anti-Belgian sentiment throughout the Congo, some of them apparently encouraged or tolerated by the government. A few Belgian citizens lost their lives in such incidents; many

(Continued on page 115)

⁵ According to official Congolese sources, the breakdown by nationality of the 160 white mercenaries interned in Rwanda after withdrawing from Bukavu was 59 Belgians, 29 Frenchmen, 16 Italians, 6 Portuguese, 4 South Africans, 3 Britons, 3 Greeks, 2 Spaniards, 2 West Germans, 1 Rhodesian, 1 Israeli, 1 Swiss.

Edouard Bustin, educated at the University of Liège, Belgium, taught administrative law and comparative government at the University of the Congo (Luubumbashi) in 1959-1960. He came to the United States in 1961. Since 1963, he has been teaching at Boston University and is a member of its African Studies Center. For the past four years, he has made annual visits to the Congo (Kinshasa) where he holds the post of *Professeur Extraordinaire* at the Faculty of Social Science and Economics of the University of the Congo. His publications include a book in French on local government and political change in British East Africa, a monograph in Gwendolyn Carter's (ed.) *Five African States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), and many articles on African politics.

"Two fundamental difficulties face the states of Africa," writes this observer, describing pressures toward unity—or pan-movements—and pressures toward separatism. As he sees it, these "challenges to political order . . . are not peculiarly African . . . but they exist in their most exacerbated form in the tenuous new states."

Nationalism and Separatism in East Africa

BY KENNETH W. GRUNDY

Visiting Professor of Political Science, Makerere University College, Uganda

IN NOVEMBER, 1966, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere said of the international situation on his continent, "Africa is in a mess. There is a devil somewhere in Africa." This was an outburst of frustration and futility aimed at the former European powers. A few days later, in a joint communiqué issued after Malian President Modibo Keita's visit to Tanzania, the same theme was repeated in an attack on "the outside influences which are working against Africa's march toward unity and progress."

To be sure, much of the difficulty plaguing the proponents of unity and stability in Africa is externally instigated. But this source can be exaggerated. Neo-colonialism exists, but it is not the sole, nor even the primary, cause of Africa's inability to unify. Other difficulties stemming from the colonial legacy continue to bedevil Africa—African difficulties, which must be solved by Africans, although outside forces may complicate settlement. The Cold War enters the African picture only peripherally.

Two fundamental difficulties face the states of Africa (and most of the other newly sovereign states of the developing world). First, some nations or communities with a common culture, heritage and destiny are dispersed or divided among several political entities. Es-

entially, reaction to this dispersion results in "pan-movements"—efforts to unify a single people or nation into a single state.

The second and far more common problem rises from the atomistic nature of popular loyalties. This is the problem of the multinational or multi-ethnic state in which minority elements are attempting to secede or realize their autonomous existence within a larger state.

We are dealing here with two sides of the same coin—two challenges to political order. Each is intimately related to the other. These are not peculiarly African problems, but they exist in their most exacerbated form in the tenuous, new states.

PAN-SOMALISM

In East Africa, the first tendency, toward unity, can be seen in a series of border wars and boundary disputes that also represent sticky issues in the domestic politics of the participants. The second tendency, toward atomism, is reflected in a number of internal, civil wars for separate status that spill over into neighboring states and thereby become international problems. The two classes of problems are interrelated and together affect the constellation and alignment of forces vitally interested in the region.

Some of East Africa's instability stems from the professed desire of the Muslim Republic of Somalia and the Somali peoples outside the Republic to be united in a single nation-state. This dream is symbolized by the five-pointed star on Somalia's flag. Each point represents a group of Somali people who were dispersed and lived under non-Muslim foreign rule, in French Somaliland, British Somaliland, the Ethiopian Haud and Ogaden, Italian Somalia, and the Northern Province of Kenya.¹

At present, only two of these groups have been "liberated," Somalis in the British and Italian territories, which were unified in the Somali Republic on independence, July 1, 1960. There are three unredeemed segments of a greater Somalia awaiting amalgamation; this has been the source of unabated tension in the Horn since 1960.

Throughout the 1950's, the pace of political, social and economic development in the Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.) of Kenya lagged behind changes in the Italian trust territory in Somalia and in the British-administered Somaliland Protectorate.² After the union and independence of the British and Italian territories, the political consciousness of the Somali inhabitants of the N.F.D. grew more acute. Political parties and groups representing Somalis in the region called on the British authorities in Nairobi to allow the Somalis to unite with the Somali Republic. They wanted to settle the issue before Kenyan independence, for they realized that the transitional period prior to independence might well be the only chance for a peaceful shift of boundaries. Both major Kenyan nationalist

parties (KANU and KADU) rejected the secessionist proposal. By supporting the Kenyan leaders and exerting pressures on the British to reject Somali claims, Ethiopia entered the discussions. She maintained that to acquiesce to Somali demands would lead to the "balkanization" of the Horn and, of course, would serve as a precedent for the detachment of the Somali-inhabited regions of Ethiopia.

In the fall of 1962, the Kenyan Colonial Secretary rejected demands for a United Nations plebiscite, and instead appointed a Commission of Inquiry to go to the N.F.D. and ascertain public opinion. Its report indicated that at least 80 per cent of the people favored unity with Somalia. Despite these findings, it became evident that the British would not detach the region before independence. The Somali government and N.F.D. Somalis immediately protested and the former broke diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom on March 18, 1963.

Somalia stressed that Britain, not Kenya, was exclusively responsible for the state of unrest in the Northern Frontier District. In 1963, this took the form of sporadic riots and violence. The British rushed troops from Aden and the secessionist battle was on. In the midst of this tension, Kenyan opinion hardened, as did that of the Somalis. By late 1963, international alignments in the Horn began to crystalize and broaden as the Somali government announced that it would receive military assistance from the Soviet Union and a mutual defense agreement was signed between Kenya and Ethiopia. Subsequently, United States military assistance to Ethiopia and continued British support to Kenyan security forces led to a Great Power confrontation of sorts.

But, basically, the N.F.D. conflict is an African issue fanned by nationalist sentiments and the fears of other African states that to recognize the legitimacy of the Somali claims (no matter how justifiable in terms of national self-determination) would weaken their own efforts toward national unification.

A 1964 Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) resolution stressing the sanctity and

¹ The populations of these territories are approximately: French Somaliland, 65,000 (half of whom are Somali); Haud and Ogaden, 750,000 Somali; Somali Republic (ex-British and Italian territories), 2,250,000; Northern Province of Kenya, 200,000 Somali in a provincial population of 300,000. The following works are recommended for background reading: Saadia Touval, *Somali Nationalism* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1963); John Drysdale, *The Somali Dispute* (New York: Praeger, 1964); I. M. Lewis, "Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism," *Journal of Modern African Studies* (June, 1963), pp. 147-161.

² For background, see A. A. Castagno, "The Somali-Kenyan Controversy: Implications for the Future," *Journal of Modern African Studies* (July, 1964), pp. 165-188.

immutability of ex-colonial frontiers served to discredit the Somali position. However, the warfare between Kenyan units and Somali "*shifta*" (bandits) or "nationalists" (depending on who is classifying them) has intensified in the past year or so, although at the present writing there has been a lull of several months. The bulk of the Kenya African Rifles and the tough General Service Unit have been engaged with guerrillas. In early 1967 it was estimated that 1,700 Somalis had been killed. The fighting has cost Kenya some £3 million in 1966 and £4 million in 1967 (\$8.4 million and \$11.2 million, respectively).

Kenya has also carried the battle to the diplomatic front. Aside from her almost constant protests to Somalia for aiding the rebels, she has made representations to the Soviet Union, whose military aid is allegedly being diverted to assist the rebels. Moreover, Kenya at first was convinced that the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) was the source of supply for landmines recently used by insurgents. Despite the Arabic lettering on the mines, the Kenya government announced in May, 1967, that it had been assured that the U.A.R. was *no longer* supplying Somalia with weapons. On her part, Somalia maintains that the "British military presence is complicating possible understanding between the two neighboring states," a charge that the Kenyans deny.

The Kenyan government has recently committed itself to a policy of forcing all Somali inhabitants in the N.F.D. to settle in villages (*manyattas*). The inhabitants must remain within a one-mile radius of their villages; if they fail to do so they are to be "dealt with as *shifta*." But this is a rather drastic approach when dealing with people who have traditionally followed their grazing cattle around the hot, inhospitable region.

Results so far have not been especially successful. Even among once loyal Somalis, there has been defection to the guerrillas.

³ A historical and geographical discussion of this issue appears in Mesfin Wolde Mariam, "The Background of the Ethio-Somalian Boundary Dispute," *Journal of Modern African Studies* (July, 1964), pp. 189-219.

Conditions in some villages are tense. The "get-tough" policy of trying to isolate *shifta* from the civilian populace, closing the border where possible and "wiping out the *shifta* [with] guns spitting fire," has served mostly to embitter the Somalis, who, bolstered by their Islamic zeal for Jihad (holy war) show little fear of dying. Guerrilla raids have been striking deeper into Kenyan territory.

Recent attempts have been made to ease tensions. On June 1, 1967, Kenya's President Jomo Kenyatta proclaimed a one-month amnesty for guerrillas who surrendered. This was later extended for 15 days. However, the results were not too successful, even according to government figures.

If future settlement is to be reached, negotiations between the involved parties are imperative. Compromise is demanded since the publicly announced positions leave little room for negotiation. Although some recent Somali government statements have been more conciliatory, the nationalists harbored in and encouraged by Mogadiscio (Somali's capital) carry the military and verbal battle to the Kenyans.

With positions ostensibly fixed, it is surprising that talks finally materialized between President Kenyatta and Somalia's Prime Minister Mohammed Ibrahim Egal, in October, 1967, at Arusha, Tanzania. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia acted as mediator, as he had at preliminary negotiations between representatives of two governments at the September, 1967, O.A.U. summit conference at Kinshasa. The result of the Arusha talks was an amicable six-point memorandum, the substance of which was that each government would do its utmost to de-escalate the hostilities, to relax emergency measures on the border, and to establish friendly diplomatic relations.

THE ETHIOPIAN HAUD AND OGADEN

Of late, the Ethiopian-Somali crisis has been less acute.³ In Ethiopia, isolated incidents are more characteristic of the war, whereas in Kenya, the government is in danger of losing control of the situation and is in direct, daily contact with the insurgents.

In general, similar sociological and anthropological conditions mark both disputes. In many respects, this is why Kenya and Ethiopia have been drawn together. Both are states without a unified national consciousness, both have governments that want to build viable, stable nations out of disparate populations.⁴

FRENCH SOMALILAND


The third "missing Somali land" is the 8,500-square-mile French enclave which the French National Assembly recently renamed "the French Territory of the Afars and Issas." Somalia contends that the territory is a vestige of colonialism and that the problems arising therefrom should be terminated by recognizing the right to self-determination of the inhabitants. But the precise wishes of the inhabitants are hard to discern, especially when faced with outside pressures from several quarters.

A referendum in March, 1967, resulting in a vote to remain French, has been the center of controversy for the past 12 months or more. The French supported the Afar during the referendum campaign and harassed Somali politicians. By insisting on a three-year residence requirement to vote, and by closely scrutinizing the electoral qualifications of perspective Somali voters, the French were able to deport perhaps as many as 6,000 "ineligible" Somalis. There were no reports of comparable Afar deportations. Thus, by ethnically stacking the registration rolls (Afar, 22,024; Somali, 14,689; Arab, 1,408; French, 923), the French could afford to be honest in the administration of the voting.

The day after the vote, Somalia announced that she would not accept "falsified results," and would therefore "continue to work for the liquidation of French colonialism in the territory." She sent a list of ten grievances to the O.A.U., attempting to elicit the Organization's support. She protested directly to France and Ethiopia, and in April presented her views to a meeting of the United Nations

⁴ For a discussion of Ethiopia's policies, see William H. Lewis, "Ethiopia: The Quickening Pulse," p. 78 of this issue.

⁵ See Lewis, *op. cit.*



—Map by Russell Lenz reprinted by permission from *The Christian Science Monitor*. © 1967 by The Christian Science Publishing Society. All rights reserved.

THE SUDAN

Special Committee on ending colonialism.

The French, who were elated with the results they had worked so hard to achieve, will not withdraw easily. Moreover, Ethiopia was equally pleased, for she feared that the economically important port of Djibouti might be won by "the hostile ring" of Muslim forces. For insurance, Ethiopia made her own claim to the territory on historical grounds. Her Emperor, Haile Selassie, let it be known that had the territory chosen independence, Ethiopia had been prepared to protect her access to the port. Clearly the referendum is no long-range solution.⁵

SEPARATISM IN ERITREA

The separatist movements, like the "pan-movements," threaten stability and unity in Africa. A sporadic guerrilla war, for example, is being waged in the predominantly Muslim province of Eritrea along Ethiopia's Red Sea coast. The Damascus-based Eri-

trean Liberation Front (E.L.F.) has an estimated 800–1,200 well-disciplined militants in the field. They have been harrasing Ethiopian security forces, and Radio Damascus periodically broadcasts E.L.F. "military communiqués," telling of E.L.F. military successes and "mass annihilation campaigns" by the Ethiopian authorities.

Several Arab states, especially Syria, but also Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and reportedly Somalia and the Sudan, are backing the E.L.F., either because of long-standing grievances with Ethiopia, because of Israel's influence in Ethiopia, or a desire to expand Arab influence southward, or a general sympathy with Muslim brothers trying to shake alien rule.

SOUTHERN SUDAN

The revolt in the southern Sudan (Azania) has been going on since 1955, and it seems no nearer settlement now than it was then.⁶ The southerners—mostly Negroes who are Christians or animists—feel that as a minority in a gigantic Sudanese state they will be and have been subjugated, persecuted and discriminated against. Moreover, attempts have been made by the north to Arabicize and Islamize them. Since there have been underlying cultural tensions between the disparate peoples for centuries, independence has only served to exacerbate the problem.

A crucial point in the possible solution to the struggle came in 1964–1965. After the overthrow of the military government of Sudanese General Ibrahim Abboud in October, 1964, some leaders hoped to take this revolutionary opportunity to settle the long and bitter armed rebellion. But the hopes of that transitional period were never fulfilled.

Southern Sudanese politics, in the Sudan and in exile, are confusingly complex and fluid. A guerrilla war between the *Anya Nya*

guerrillas and the Sudanese army was in full scale by June, 1965, after the March, 1965, Round Table Conference between northern and southern leaders failed to reach a settlement. The *Anya Nya* proved to be a formidable fighting force, and the Sudanese government occasionally turned against southern civil servants and civilians whom they suspected of conspiring with the *Anya Nya*. Many civilian deaths resulted and the number of Sudanese refugees rose from an estimated 13,000 in January, 1964, to some 115,000 by 1967, almost half of whom are in Uganda.

Moreover, by 1967 most southern politicians had decided that they were no longer interested in association, under any terms, with the north, but preferred to seek the total independence of the three southern provinces as the Republic of Azania. But, although the situation continues to deteriorate within the Sudan, the insurgents have been having problems of their own.

Aside from the usual personal and tribal divisions found in exiled insurgent movements under stress, host governments have done their best to obstruct the use of their territory for organizing subversive activities against the neighboring Sudan. One can imagine the quandary of the Uganda government, for example, as it finds itself caught between cross-pressures. It wants to assist refugees in distress but it also wants good relations with its neighbors. So Uganda has vacillated in her policies toward refugee politicians. She has also played a positive role in attempting to mediate between the Sudan and the refugees.

Efforts have been made by the Sudanese government to repatriate refugees. Amnes-

(Continued on page 112)

⁶ Coverage of this issue can be found in Joseph Oduho and William Deng, *The Problem of the Southern Sudan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). The authors are leaders in the separatist movement. See also George W. Shepherd, "National Integration and the Southern Sudan," *Journal of Modern African Studies* (October, 1966), pp. 193–212, and Keith Kyle, "The Southern Problem in the Sudan," *The World Today* (December, 1966), pp. 512–520.

Kenneth W. Grundy, associate professor of political science at Western Reserve University, has been interested in the policies and problems of the emerging states for some time, and is now teaching in Kampala, Uganda. He is coauthor of *African Socialism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), and has written many articles on African politics, ideologies and international relations.

Evaluating the difficulties which Ghana faces before she is returned to civilian rule, this specialist notes that the regime faces severe criticism because of its unpopular, but necessary, measures. Furthermore, the National Liberation Council members realize that "Reorientation requires time, energy, support, awakened civic consciousness and responsibilities, and a firm economic foundation."

Ghana: The Politics of Military Withdrawal

By CLAUDE E. WELCH, JR.

Dean, University College, State University of New York at Buffalo

TWO YEARS have passed since army and police officers toppled the regime of President Kwame Nkrumah. When and how civilian government will be restored remains unclear, despite the efforts of Ghana's top leaders to assure a smooth transition. Less than a week after the coup, the National Liberation Council, composed of coup leaders, announced that its members had no political ambitions and were "anxious to hand over power to a duly constituted representative civil government as soon as possible." Noble sentiments, these, but difficult to carry out. The 24 months of army control have illustrated how difficult it would be to return to civilian rule while major economic and political problems remain unresolved.

Since February 24, 1966, Ghanaian politics has operated within a context of financial retrenchment, revelations of mismanagement under Nkrumah, and gropings toward civilian participation. The timetable for reforms pledged by the National Liberation Council (N.L.C.) has lengthened. What seems to be emerging is a coalition of top army and police officers, some politicians who previously opposed Nkrumah and selected civil servants.

The N.L.C. retains unchallenged control. This new group of leaders—moderate in policy; respectful of Ghana's heritage; more concerned with resolving domestic problems than strutting on the pan-African stage—has installed collective leadership under General Joseph Ankrah, leadership utterly distinct from the personal political machine Nkrumah built.¹

How stable is the new coalition? Might the economic vicissitudes of fiscal retrenchment undercut the support the National Liberation Council currently enjoys? Can elections be further delayed while the country resolves its financial problems? Such are the imponderables of Ghana today.

In 1966 the N.L.C. confronted three major obstacles. Pledged to restore Ghana "to an even keel politically, socially and economically," in the words of General Ankrah, the N.L.C. viewed its role first of all as curative, purging the state of Nkrumahist elements. Second, the ruling junta confronted a grave economic situation: foreign currency reserves had been reduced 80 per cent in less than a decade; crushing external debts, many of them short-term, neared \$1 billion; inefficient import regulations brought crippling shortages of vital materials; world prices for cocoa, Ghana's main export, had fallen to a

¹ Henry L. Bretton, *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah: A Study of Personal Rule in Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 41-100.

20-year low. Third, and most important, the National Liberation Council confronted substantial political problems in shepherding the people through a difficult transitional period. The population—and its would-be political leaders—had to be reeducated to handle the changed conditions. Support had to be built for policies, such as fiscal austerity and currency devaluation, that would adversely affect large sections of society. These obstacles would challenge even the most skilled politician, and the members of the N.L.C., all professional officers, had little experience in the rough-and-tumble arena of Ghanaian politics.

RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY?

Shortly after Nkrumah's overthrow, Ankrah announced that the N.L.C. would "run the affairs of this country until true democracy based on the popular will of the people and not on the will of one man alone has been fully restored." "True democracy" implies many attributes but in February, 1966, few democratic prerequisites existed. Voting registers were out-of-date and likely falsified in many constituencies; political parties were ill-organized (parties opposing Nkrumah's Convention People's party had been declared constitutionally illegal early in 1964, and the C.P.P. itself was banned by the N.L.C. after the coup); and repressive policies had diminished press freedom.

The N.L.C. might have pursued two alternative strategies to restore democracy. On the one hand, the military rulers could have established a coalition of civilians not tainted by association with Nkrumah, then retired to the barracks within a very short period. Alternatively, the N.L.C. might have attempted to create "true democracy" under its direct aegis, attempting to create and channel political awareness without civilian intermediaries.

Neither strategy was selected. Faced with a situation of bewildering complexity, the Council reacted pragmatically. Its members agreed on the urgency of reform, and found it increasingly difficult to disengage themselves from control. The result has been a shifting level of civilian influence in what remains (despite the protestations of the N.L.C.) a

government clearly directed by the men who overthrew Nkrumah. A brief review of events since the coup makes this point clear.

THREE N.L.C. STEPS

After an initial period of hesitation, members of the N.L.C. took over cabinet positions. But increasing insistence from former politicians who had opposed Nkrumah, coupled with recurrent promises by General Ankrah about civilian rule, indicated that an expanded role for civilians was essential. In July, 1966, a 23-member "Political Committee" was named; its membership list read like a "Who's Who" of erstwhile Ghanaian politicians—two founders of the United Gold Coast Convention (a party established in 1946 to bring self-government "in the shortest possible time"), and several prominent opponents of Nkrumah. The Committee was instructed to examine the enactments, decisions and policies made since the coup d'état. However, its advisory powers were severely limited. Apart from giving a number of talented and highly educated men a symbolic role in the government, the Political Committee accomplished little. But it should also be pointed out that the institutional context for decision-making remained amorphous. Until the N.L.C. decided to admit unequivocal civilian participation, uncertainties and frustrations were bound to occur.

Following the creation of the Political Committee, the N.L.C. established a constitutional committee. The committee, named in September, 1966, was not to prepare and ratify a constitution, but was to collect varying opinions from the citizenry. From such evidence, the committee would prepare a draft constitution for subsequent debate and ratification by a constituent assembly. The committee's activities were limited. The grass-roots consultation was not fully carried out. Although conclusive evidence is not available, it seems likely that the N.L.C. did not wish to awaken unrealistic hopes of a rapid return to civilian rule. Civic reeducation lagged behind the pace the military leaders had foreseen. As Colonel A. A. Afrifa noted in March, 1967,

It may be necessary to let the people get used to their newly won freedom and to familiarize themselves with the qualities that they require from potential leaders before they are called upon to go to the polls.

He added that the return to civilian rule would also require destruction of the image of the Convention People's party and removal of factors, particularly economic factors, that led to the coup. Once again, the N.L.C. did not carry through with a policy it had apparently supported. Continued economic uncertainties appeared far more pressing than a rapid transition to an elected government.

The third major step taken by the N.L.C. came on June 30, 1967, with the establishment of a 21-member Executive Committee; two-thirds of the members were civilians. The most significant positions—interior, external affairs, defense, and finance—remained in N.L.C. hands. The Executive Committee was charged with "general direction and control" of the government, but these prerogatives were subject to the powers of the N.L.C. The majority of the men brought into the cabinet were not former politicians, but rather highly trained former civil servants, educators and technocrats. Their major task was to help establish the "even keel" which the N.L.C. had sought for 16 months. Formation of a National Advisory Committee, replacing the Political Committee established a year earlier, followed on July 11, 1967; the 31-member board was chaired by K. A. Busia. Economic reforms appeared paramount, and it was not fortuitous that currency devaluation occurred less than two weeks after the naming of the Executive Committee and a matter of days after creation of the advisory committee.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Several steps remain before complete civilian rule returns to Ghana. N.L.C. members realize that sweeping reforms cannot simply be promulgated in an official gazette, nor guaranteed by a well-intentioned elected government. Reorientation requires time, energy, support, awakened civic consciousness and responsibilities, and a firm economic

foundation. To achieve "true democracy" may require a written constitution. This, in turn, requires examination by a constituent assembly of the draft prepared by the constitutional committee; choice of the constituent assembly requires delimitation of constituencies, preparation of new voting registers, and a fundamental decision by the N.L.C. as to whether campaigns for the constituent assembly should be fought on a partisan or a non-party basis. Basic issues thus remain unresolved. Should all former C.P.P. members be barred from public life? Can "true democracy" flourish without political parties? Has the economic situation sufficiently improved to encourage the army to make good its promises of returning to the barracks? Until clear answers are forthcoming, the N.L.C. may expect rising criticism which, thus far, has been successfully contained.

The army itself presents one potential danger to the National Liberation Council. The apparent ease with which Nkrumah and many other African politicians were ousted by army leaders does not pass unnoticed. Once officers have demonstrated that a simple show of force may topple a government, other members of the military may be tempted to mutiny. A series of counter-coups, of dissent and rebellion in the army, seem a possible outcome of military intervention.

The N.L.C. faced its first significant internal challenge on April 17, 1967. Officers of a reconnaissance regiment stationed near Ho (90 miles northeast of Accra, the capital) conspired to overthrow the ruling group by assassinating its leading members and seizing radio facilities in Accra. A dawn attack on the residence of General E. K. Kotoka (the main agent in the overthrow of Nkrumah) resulted in the death of four members of the regular army, including Kotoka. The leader of the revolt, 25-year-old Lieutenant Samuel Arthur, claimed during his trial that promotions of junior officers were not being granted rapidly enough. In other words, complaints about internal army matters had been transformed from barracks' gripes into incentives to rebel. Lieutenant Arthur and coconspirator Lieutenant Moses Yeboah were executed

before a large crowd on May 9, long-term imprisonment was given other soldiers implicated in the plot, and 489 persons were placed in protective custody. The lesson was clear. The N.L.C. would be threatened by other counter-coups unless it maintained a high degree of cohesion and surveillance in the armed forces. Restoration of civilian rule, therefore, depended in part on military unity of purpose.

ECONOMIC RETRENCHMENT

Nkrumah left an economic shambles behind. By tropical African standards, Ghana was, and remains, one of the continent's wealthiest states, with an annual per capita income greater than \$250. Blessed with extensive foreign exchange reserves at independence, the state suffered from numerous extravagant and misguided economic ventures. General Ankrah did not mince his words: Nkrumah "brought Ghana to the brink of economic disaster by mismanagement, waste and unwise spending." To document the former government's profligate financial policies and endemic corruption, the N.L.C. appointed a series of special commissions. Their revelations filled the Ghana press for many months; unfortunately, disclosure of previous shortcomings cannot resolve immediate economic problems. The N.L.C. doubtless gained support as the extent of financial manipulation became public. However, fundamental reforms proved necessary, and the medicine chosen—financial retrenchment through austerity and deflation—was bound to be unpalatable.

Four basic economic difficulties confronted the N.L.C. on the morrow of the coup. A severe, adverse balance of overseas payments had practically exhausted Ghana's external reserves. Budget deficits had been the rule, not the exception; inflation and food shortages had directly affected the articulate urban sectors of the population. In the face of a slow-

down of economic activity, it became increasingly difficult to find employment, particularly for school leavers. (Between 1965 and 1970, an estimated 752,000 middle school leavers* will enter the labor force; but in the decade 1954–1964, the number of jobs in the modern sector of the economy grew from 225,000 to 350,000.)² Any major attempts at deflation would have direct impact on the rate of unemployment—the political and security risks of a large jobless urban group must not be underestimated.

One factor in Ghana's economic plight was the drain on state resources from state firms. Thirty-seven such companies were established under the Nkrumah regime, few of which proved profitable. A few weeks after the coup, Ankrah decided to restrict the extent of the governmental economic participation that had proved so costly. Active state participation, he noted, "will be limited to certain basic and key projects." The private sector of the economy would remain the most significant, in terms of both output and employment. Joint private-government enterprises, and cooperative ventures, would also be encouraged.

Compared with pre-1966 policy, the National Liberation Council's economic priorities placed far greater stress on private initiative. State firms were reorganized. Three were sold to Ghanaian businessmen, and private participation was encouraged. Several United States firms, including Firestone Rubber, Abbot Laboratories, and Intercontinental Hotels (a Pan American subsidiary), agreed to assume responsibility for former state firms. To reduce the continuing financial drain, one-third of the farms operated by the Farms Corporation were closed; Ghana Airways reduced its operating deficit by cancelling orders for surplus aircraft, returning several Ilyushin aircraft to the Soviet Union, and arranging traffic pools with Nigeria Airways.

The most significant economic step of 1967 occurred in July, with the devaluation of the *cedi* from \$1.40 to \$.98. Currency devaluation is a well-known device to improve a state's export position and reduce imports.

² Figures from Walter Birmingham, *et al.*, eds., *A Study of Contemporary Ghana*, Vol. II, (Evans-ton: Northwestern University Press, 1967), pp. 232–3.

* Editor's note: Middle school leavers are those who have completed the American equivalent of less than eight grades, i.e., those who do not go on to secondary education.

The 30 per cent devaluation was offset by increased prices for cocoa (a move that helped reduce discontent among the politically influential farmers of Ashanti), elimination of import duties on food, milk, and other essential goods, and a 5 per cent salary increase for civil servants. Devaluation indirectly boosted the sagging timber and gold mining industries, whose rising costs had made profitable operation unfeasible.

The overall, long-range effects of the government's actions cannot be assessed at this juncture. Brigadier A. A. Afrifa claimed that the devaluation would "reactivate the economy, increase production and employment, and set the stage for more accelerated development in the future"—but these assertions must be taken with due caution. It should be noted that the International Monetary Fund had urged devaluation, and acceptance of this advice bears witness to the willingness of the N.L.C. to turn to expert advice, even at the cost of politically unpopular side effects at home.

The 1967–1968 budget, like its immediate predecessor, stressed consolidation. (The N.L.C. scrapped the budget Nkrumah had prepared immediately before his ouster, and instead introduced a special budget in August, 1966.) Official projections allowed for a slight surplus: estimated recurrent expenses of \$297 million, development expenses of \$88 million, and estimated receipts of slightly over \$385 million. Ghana also called on Harvard University to furnish a team of economists to work out a new development plan. The "Seven-Year Development Plan" prepared by the Nkrumah government earlier had been rejected by the N.L.C. as overambitious and unrealistic.

Reckless financing by the Nkrumah regime also confronted the N.L.C. with a serious foreign debt problem. Shortly after the coup, it was estimated that repayment of external commitments would consume a quarter of all foreign exchange earnings—funds urgently needed for development. Many of the debts resulted from pre-financing arrangements made by contractors. Rates of interest were high, and the economic utility of several proj-

ects remains debatable. In this situation, the Council confronted a basic dilemma. It wished to demonstrate its fiscal responsibility by meeting debts accumulated under Nkrumah. However, the government could not meet the heavy commitments of funds necessary for debt servicing. The only solution lay in considerably expanded international assistance and debt rescheduling, to allow the Ghanaian economy a breathing spell.

During 1966 and 1967, the bulk of Ghana's financial commitments (more than \$560 million) were rescheduled. Economic assistance, drawn mainly from the International Monetary Fund and from Western states, reached \$70 million in 1967. The balance of payments deficit, however, could not be eliminated. The Ghanaian economy remains hobbled by a lack of spare parts and raw materials. Ironically, the import licensing regulations established by the Nkrumah government to save foreign exchange may have gravely weakened the country's position. For example, insufficient amounts of insecticide were imported in 1965–1966, thereby reducing the cocoa crop.

Serious economic dislocations remain, in spite of the N.L.C.'s sincere and extensive retrenchment efforts. More than half the local industrial capacity is unutilized, owing to the lack of raw materials. The heavy public investments of the past decade did not increase the economy's rate of growth, and the burgeoning population (the average Ghanaian mother bears more than seven children) has absorbed any rise in per capita gross national product. The economy as a whole remains primarily dependent on cocoa, and though the N.L.C. has fortunately profited from rising world prices, the vagaries of the international market may jeopardize overall economic recovery.

Economic stagnation brings other problems in its train. Great internal migration in Ghana, particularly from the villages to urban centers, has compounded unemployment. Rural underemployment has become urban unemployment, since most educated youth scorn jobs that appear menial or "traditional." Only an extraordinarily rapid ex-

pansion of the modern sector of the economy can absorb these internal migrants. Given the basically cautious and pragmatic economic policies espoused by the Council, creation of jobs for jobs' sake appears unlikely. Unemployment can be reduced only by a basic change in attitudes, whereby the school leaver does not automatically escape to the city to avoid what he sees as a sterile, uninteresting, and unprofitable life in "the bush."

FOREIGN POLICY COMMITMENTS

Preoccupation with domestic reconstruction has reduced Ghana's role in international affairs under the N.L.C., as contrasted with the flamboyant, pan-African aspirations of Nkrumah. The coup d'état brought three basic shifts in emphasis in Ghanaian foreign policy. First, relations with the neighboring French-speaking states (Ivory Coast, Togo and Upper Volta) improved markedly. Good fences do not necessarily make good neighbors—but the decision of Ghana and Upper Volta to demarcate their border bore witness to more cordial relations.

The second shift occurred in intra-African politics. Nkrumah's vision of African unity was grounded on an unshakable belief in the necessity for political union. Almost alone among African leaders, he argued for a continental government—an assertion contrary to the basic trends in African politics.³ The N.L.C. members, stressing internal solidarity and development, were far more in tune with their fellow rulers than was Nkrumah. Ghana thus came to work more closely with other African states on such issues as Rhodesia, and South West Africa, and to aid, through the Organization of African Unity, independence movements in Portuguese territories.

Far more cordial relations with Western states represented the third change. The earnest efforts of the Council to regain economic equilibrium and restore political choice won strong approval in Washington, London and Bonn. General Ankrah's visit to Great

Britain, Canada and the United States in October, 1967, further helped to cement the ties his government had carefully nurtured.

The growing schisms and eventual civil war in Nigeria directly involved Ghana. On several occasions, Ankrah offered to mediate between the federal government and the secessionist Biafran regime of Colonel Odunegwu Ojukwu. In January, 1967, he arranged a meeting of Nigerian leaders at Aburi, a palatial country estate built (but never occupied) by Nkrumah. The agreement reached quickly broke down, in a welter of claims and counter-claims.⁴ When fighting erupted in July, Ankrah redoubled his efforts at mediation; in November, as an official delegate of the Organization of African Unity, he visited Lagos in an unsuccessful effort to halt the conflict. Ghana's major foreign policy efforts during 1967 thus came to naught, the victim of an unfortunate clash between primordial sentiments of tribalism and political desires for national unity.

LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

During 1967 the N.L.C. continued to follow the paths of economic responsibility, pragmatic political adjustment and limited collaboration with civilians. The regime was courageous. Staking their claim to historical renown on financial reconstruction, the members of the National Liberation Council attempted to postpone full transition to civilian rule until the economic situation had been righted.

(Continued on page 113)

In addition to his duties as dean of the undergraduate division, Claude E. Welch, Jr. is also an assistant professor of political science at the State University of New York at Buffalo. He is author of *Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), editor of *Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Political Change* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1967) and a contributor to *Patterns of African Development*, edited by H. J. Spiro (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

³ Claude E. Welch, Jr., *Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 357.

⁴ For a discussion of Nigeria, see John D. Chick, "Nigeria at War," in this issue, p. 65.

The Nations of Africa



—Map by Russell Lenz reprinted by permission from *The Christian Science Monitor*.
© 1965 by The Christian Science Publishing Society. All rights reserved.

KEY: At the beginning of this century Liberia and Ethiopia were the only independent countries in Africa. By 1965, only the areas in black were not fully independent. In late 1965, Rhodesia unilaterally declared her independence from Britain and, in 1966, both Bechuanaland and Basutoland became independent. They are now known as Botswana and Lesotho, respectively.

BOOK REVIEWS

Studies On Africa

By W. A. E. SKURNIK

Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado

THE REDS AND THE BLACKS. By WILLIAM ATTWOOD. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 334 pages and index, \$5.95.)

The personal adventures of a journalist whose domestic political affiliation led to ambassadorships in Guinea and Kenya, this is an interesting narrative. Although Attwood thinks we pay too much attention to the cold war, his story centers on the Communists' discomfiture and his exploits in the administration of foreign policy and in making friends in Africa. The discussions of Attwood's involvement in domestic and inter-African affairs provide especially readable background and convey the impression of easy accomplishments with dynamism and good will. The author highlights the advantages enjoyed by a political appointee, but he appears to be overoptimistic in his understanding of things African.

FREEDOM AND UNITY. By JULIUS K. NYERERE. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. 350 pages, \$7.50.)

Seventy speeches, articles, and other extracts are conveniently assembled from material dating from 1952 to mid-1965, covering a great variety of subjects on domestic and international affairs.

Tanzania's President Nyerere emerges from this material as a sensitive, thoughtful leader whose theoretical contributions cannot be neglected. The collection is useful for the study of political theory in Africa as well as of political experimentation in Tanzania.

MAURITANIA. By ALFRED G. GERTEINY. (New York: Praeger, 1967. 210 pages, appendices, glossary, index and bibliography, \$6.00.)

A historical account of Mauritania today, this book is welcome as the first available study in English of a relatively little-known but not unimportant African new nation. The 17 chapters discuss Mauritania's geography, traditional society and mores, language and literature, as well as more modern aspects of independence and economic planning. Particularly topical are discussions of the black minorities, relations with Morocco, and the impact on the economy and politics of mineral wealth recently discovered.

PORTUGUESE AFRICA. By RONALD H. CHILCOTE (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967. 128 pages, bibliography, index and maps, \$4.95 cloth, \$1.95 paper.)

This is a historical account of relations between Portugal and her African colonies. Two chapters review the extension of Portuguese influence into Africa and some fundamental problems of adaptation; another contrasts Portuguese nationalism and the notion of Portuguese tropicology with several strains of African nationalism; three chapters are devoted to a description of events in Portuguese Africa up to the present; and a final chapter reviews future prospects.

Portugal's colonial policy failed to accomplish its aims because of deficiencies in the political, economic and social systems.

of the metropole; hence the gap between ideal and reality could never be bridged. Largely because Portugal is herself an underdeveloped country controlled by a small oligarchy which is unresponsive to notions of democracy, attempts to perpetuate her colonial control are doomed. The continuing vitality of African resistance to foreign occupation, combined with the influence of the United Nations and of modern African nationalist aspirations, militate against the continuation of Portuguese domination in Africa.

THE DRAGON'S EMBRACE: THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND AFRICA. BY EMMANUEL JOHN HEVI. (New York: Praeger, 1967. 137 pages, illustrations and index, \$5.95.)

In eight brief chapters, the author outlines the general features of Chinese ideology and international behavior and tells why he believes Africa should beware of China. He warns against excessive anti-Westernism, describes some Chinese incursions into African sovereignty, and concludes with a statement of personal faith in Africa.

PATTERNS OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT: FIVE COMPARISONS. EDITED BY HERBERT J. SPIRO (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967. 144 pages, \$4.95 cloth, \$1.95 paper.)

In this volume, five essays focus on the theme of repetition or innovation in Africa's development. Carl Friedrich assumes that the Western constitutional experience is a universal model but recognizes that new nations must innovate because "the prerequisites of constitutional government are lacking and will have to be developed." Ibrahim Abu-Lughod considers five factors giving African nationalism a distinctive stamp, and concludes that it is "much broader and more human" than its historical antecedents. Claude Welch compares Japan and Africa in their common desire to modernize, and concludes that Japan is not a model for Africa. Ali

Mazrui examines how African leaders have inherited liberalism and socialism from the West and have transformed these notions to suit social and economic needs. In the final chapter, the editor leans toward innovation in surveying African experience. Friedrich and Welch are relatively pessimistic in assessing the value of drawing on the experiences of other nations; Abu-Lughod and Spiro are relatively optimistic; and Mazrui tends to be balanced and descriptive in his evaluation.

BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS. BY FRANTZ FANON. (New York: Grove Press, 1967. 232 pages, \$5.00.)

Addressing himself to the false and pernicious self-image which black men have adopted from whites, the author deftly dissects—and discards—linguistic, sexual and psychological aspects of that image as a result of which the Negro tends to despise himself. Based primarily on the experience of his native Martinique, Fanon urges the black man to restructure his perceptions; echoing some other African thinkers (the book was first published in France in 1952, and much of it is reminiscent of early *négritude*), he notes that the Negro perpetuates his agony if he wants to be a carbon-copy of the white. He suggests a solution: to discover, nurture and assert a separate personality. The black man must therefore change his self-perception as well as the environment that reinforces it.

THE ANATOMY OF UHURU. BY N. S. CAREY JONES. (New York: Praeger, 1967. 217 pages, appendix and index, \$6.50.)

An attempt to understand why Kenya became independent and to assess her future prospects, this is a review of Kenya's geographic, economic and human background. The author devotes two outstanding chapters to the transition period to independence and to external influences that helped shape the course of events. Three concluding chapters review and evaluate the post-independence period and suggest

that Kenya's future may be less than brilliant.

AFRICA: THE POLITICS OF UNITY—AN ANALYSIS OF A CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL MOVEMENT. By IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN. (New York: Random, 1967. 253 pages, index and appendices; \$4.95.)

Well-written; persuasive and controversial, this study offers an interpretation of the objectives and dynamics of African inter-state relations. The "radical-moderate" dichotomy is presented as the interaction between a "core" social movement seeking to achieve political, economic and social equality with developed nations by militant means, and a "periphery" of pragmatic, cautious states aiming for the same goals but working simultaneously to "tame" the core of African nationalists. The core thus operates in an ambiguous and unfavorable environment which has not—so far—lent itself to genuine and successful revolutionary action. The core comprises, some seven nations (less Ghana), the All-African Trades Union Federation, radical opposition groups, and some liberation movements; it is "the most important indigenous political force on the continent, the only one that at all competed with the strength of the Western world."

Continental political unification provides the only satisfactory way to achieve independence from neocolonialism, and non-alignment understandably leans toward communism to offset continued Western pressures. Acceptance of this central thesis will depend largely upon the reader's estimate of the proper relationship between means and ends.

INDEPENDENT AFRICA: THE CHALLENGE TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION. By L. C. B. GOWER. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. 145 pages and index, \$3.95.)

An expansion of 1966 Harvard lectures, this study was written by an eminent British

specialist on African legal problems. Part one sketches 11 political, economic, psychological and legal aspects of the British colonial legacy in West and East African states. Part two reviews the way the legacy has been and the reasons it cannot always be adapted. Part three focuses on the actual needs of the legal profession in these countries and recommends a greater American effort. The author is sympathetic to Africa's needs, pays tribute to its leaders for their maturity, and encourages their efforts to correct the deficiencies of the British legacy.

AN AFRICAN SEASON. By LEONARD LEVITT. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967. 223 pages, \$4.50.)

This is an account of the lessons learned—and taught—by a Peace Corps volunteer during a teaching assignment in a remote town in Tanzania and a subsequent vacation in Rhodesia and South Africa. Although it is marred by occasional, unconcerned ignorance and by folksy naivete, the book conveys the flavor of living in black Africa, sympathy to the Africans' plight, the author's candidness, and the chasm between Southern Africa's whites and their black neighbors.

MISCELLANY

LATIN AMERICA IN WORLD POLITICS. By NORMAN A. BAILEY. (New York: Walker and Company, 1967. 179 pages, appendices and index, \$7.50.)

The role of Latin America in world politics from colonial times to the cold war is surveyed in this study. Considerable attention is given to the genesis and the evolution of the inter-American system. The appendices contain relevant documents including the Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries, the Charter of the O.A.S., the Rio Treaty, the Act of Bogatá, the Charter of Punta del Este and the Montevideo Treaty.

Mary Anderberg

THE WEST INDIES AND THE GUIANAS. BY D. A. G. WADDELL. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967. 136 pages, suggested readings, appendix, map and index, \$4.95.)

A volume in the Modern Nations in Perspective Series, this focuses on the territories in the Caribbean area that are now emerging into a state of full independence. The author, senior lecturer in history at the University of Edinburgh, presents a clear analysis of the historical factors and the current economic, social and political problems which have an influence on the area as a whole. He outlines the geographic, cultural and ethnic factors in the development of the area. The sugar and slave economy which developed in the late seventeenth century and lasted well into the nineteenth century is described, as is the transition which followed the emancipation movement. The continuing problems of overpopulation and underemployment, poverty and uncertain national identities are discussed. In conclusion, it is noted that while the area has moved away from colonialism since 1930, "it has not yet succeeded in divesting itself entirely of the colonial psychology and dependent mentality rooted in its historical experience."

M.A.

THE ORIGINS OF MALAY NATIONALISM. BY WILLIAM R. ROFF. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. 297 pages, glossary, bibliography, and index, \$8.50.)

This is a sophisticated study which seeks to interpret the causes of Malay and Muslim reform movements in the early part of this century in the Peninsular Malay States and the Straits Settlements. As the influence of traditional communal leaders faded and the political impact of Western and English speaking leaders grew, the Malay community began to turn to modern organizational forms in support of its economic and religious interests. The early political study groups performed the sig-

nificant function of preserving the symbols of Malay authority in village and urban areas. The apparent threat of alien, i.e., Chinese, and to a lesser extent European and Indian, encroachments on established Malay rights was to give birth to a number of radical parties after the initial period of British intervention in the internal affairs of the individual states. The reader will find much information about the relationship of colonial rule to one form of indigenous, administrative, religious authority.

René Peritz

Indiana State University

BRAZILIAN PLANNING. DEVELOPMENT POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION. BY ROBERT T. DALAND. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967. 220 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$6.00.)

The administration of national planning in Brazil between 1945 and 1965 is examined in detail in this study which offers an excellent evaluation of the effectiveness of planning techniques in a developing economy. At the same time it reveals many of the political pressures which disturb the nation's economic growth.

M.A.

SOUTHEAST ASIAN TRIBES, MINORITIES, AND NATIONS. Volumes I & II. EDITED BY PETER KUNSTADTER. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. 915 pages, charts, tables, maps and photographs, \$22.50.)

These two useful volumes discuss ethnic categories and national minorities in Burma, China, India, Thailand, Laos, Malaysia and Vietnam. Several other topics such as the operating procedures of a strategic hamlet program in South Vietnam, the importance of the Tribal Research Center in Thailand to the country's sense of nationhood, and the Asia Foundation's Programming for Tribal and Minority Peoples in Southeast Asia are presented in less detail. The need for defining the concept of "a people" is urgently stressed in a care-

ful introductory statement, and the greater need for effective Asian understanding of Asian groups and sub-cultures is cogently argued. R.P.

THE FALL OF SUKARNO. By TARZIE VITTACHI. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 191 pages, \$4.95.)

A broad-sweeping impressionistic, subjective indictment of President Sukarno, this work is in large part a recapping of the famous (or infamous) attempt by the Indonesian Communist party (P.K.I) to neutralize the power of the army in late 1965, and the subsequent massacres of hundreds of Javanese, Balinese and other islanders who were caught in the terrors of those unhappy days. The following citation is instructive of the author's approach to the topic. In referring to the many plots that followed the P.K.I.-army confrontation he notes that:

Since no Indonesian was ideologically or emotionally non-involved, no independent body like the Earl Warren Commission . . . could have been appointed to collect and assess the evidence [of events in Djakarta that sparked the Indonesia bloodbaths]. R.P.

BATTLES IN THE MONSOON. By S. L. A. MARSHALL. (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1967. 408 pages and index, \$6.95.)

This is a survey of various battles in the plains and highlands of South Vietnam between American detachments and Vietnamese irregulars. After a brief and incisive foreword on the difficulty of gathering accurate news from the zones of skirmish, the writer considers three separate campaigns against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese army—campaigns in which the United States forces prevailed over their foes. Each of the many chapters involves a broad discussion of the various military levels from company to top command. General Marshall has traveled extensively in the area in which the combat took place, and he describes in dramatic fashion the many obstacles men face in adjusting to the fluid nature of guerrilla war. R.P.

SOCIALIST PARTIES IN POSTWAR JAPAN. By ALLAN B. COLE, GEORGE O. TOTTEN and CECIL H. UYEHARA. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. 490 pages, tables, charts and index, \$12.50.)

The development of Japanese political parties, labor unions and pressure groups is stressed in great detail in this treatise on *Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan*. The authors present a formidable argument demonstrating that organized associations in Japan are undergoing change. They conclude that contemporary left-wing informal and institutional groups can effectively survive on a dynamic basis only if they ". . . rethink the Socialist position in the light of the changing evolution of both totalitarian socialism and increasingly regulated capitalism." R.P.

VICTOR CHARLIE. By KUNO KNOEBL. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 304 pages, \$5.95.)

This is a newspaperman's approach to one side of the Vietnamese conflict and is of considerable interest to the reader who wishes to understand the Viet Cong as human beings. The author argues that the guerrillas have time on their side in their efforts to achieve their political destiny. Irrespective of the acceptability of his premise, he does make a persuasive case for looking at the Vietnamese peasants as people. R.P.

THE IMPACT OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, 1917-1967. ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1967. 357 pages and index, \$7.50.)

Celebrations commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution are over, but the stream of books on this theme may be expected to swell in the months ahead. Five distinguished specialists have pooled their talents and presented a series of essays that, taken as a whole, are of superior quality. Hugh Seton-Watson

(Continued on page 115)

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

On August 24, 1967, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted identical texts of a draft treaty to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. The complete text of the proposed American draft follows:

The States concluding this Treaty, herein-after referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty,"

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,

whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Noting that nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude,

regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

(International Control; left blank)

Article IV

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty, as well as the right of the Parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Article V

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose

amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

Article VI

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of ———, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and ——— other States signatory to this Treaty, and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the

purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference of other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article VII

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article VIII

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

U. N. Resolution on South West Africa

On May 19, 1967, the U.N. General Assembly approved a resolution reaffirming the territorial integrity of South West Africa and its people's inalienable right to freedom and independence, and establishing a United Nations Council for South West Africa.¹ The resolution was adopted 85 to 2, with 30 nations (including the United States) abstaining. The complete text of the resolution follows:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Ad Hoc Committee for South West Africa,

Reaffirming its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Reaffirming its resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, by which it terminated the Mandate conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa and decided that South Africa had no other right

to administer the Territory of South West Africa,

Having assumed direct responsibility for the Territory of South West Africa in accordance with resolution 2145 (XXI),

Recognizing that it has thereupon become incumbent upon the United Nations to give effect to its obligations by taking practical steps to transfer power to the people of South West Africa,

I

Reaffirms the territorial integrity of South West Africa and the inalienable right of its people to freedom and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United

¹Not yet functioning. See "Southern Africa: the White Fortress," pp. 72 ff. of this issue.

Nations, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and all other resolutions concerning South West Africa;

II

1. *Decides* to establish a United Nations Council for South West Africa (hereinafter referred to as the Council) comprising eleven Member States to be elected during the present session and to entrust to it the following powers and functions, to be discharged in the Territory:

(a) To administer South West Africa until independence, with the maximum possible participation of the people of the Territory;

(b) To promulgate such laws, decrees and administrative regulations as are necessary for the administration of the Territory until a legislative assembly is established following elections conducted on the basis of universal adult suffrage;

(c) To take as an immediate task all the necessary measures, in consultation with the people of the Territory, for the establishment of a constituent assembly to draw up a constitution on the basis of which elections will be held for the establishment of a legislative assembly and a responsible government;

(d) To take all the necessary measures for the maintenance of law and order in the Territory;

(e) To transfer all powers to the people of the Territory upon the declaration of independence;

2. *Decides* that in the exercise of its powers and in the discharge of its functions the Council shall be responsible to the General Assembly;

3. *Decides* that the Council shall entrust such executive and administrative tasks as it deems necessary to a United Nations Commissioner for South West Africa (hereinafter referred to as the Commissioner), who shall be appointed during the present session by the General Assembly on the nomination of the Secretary-General;

4. *Decides* that in the performance of his tasks the Commissioner shall be responsible to the Council;

III

1. *Decides* that:

(a) The administration of South West Africa under the United Nations shall be financed from the revenues collected in the Territory;

(b) Expenses directly related to the operation of the Council and the Office of the Commissioner—the travel and subsistence expenses of members of the Council, the remuneration of the Commissioner and his staff and the cost of ancillary facilities—shall be met from the regular budget of the United Nations;

2. *Requests* the specialized agencies and the appropriate organs of the United Nations to render to South West Africa technical and financial assistance through a co-ordinated emergency programme to meet the exigencies of the situation;

IV

1. *Decides* that the Council shall be based in South West Africa;

2. *Requests* the Council to enter immediately into contact with the authorities of South Africa in order to lay down procedures, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) and the present resolution, for the transfer of the administration of the Territory with the least possible upheaval;

3. *Further requests* the Council to proceed to South West Africa with a view to:

(a) Taking over the administration of the Territory;

(b) Ensuring the withdrawal of South African police and military forces;

(c) Ensuring the withdrawal of South African personnel and their replacement by personnel operating under the authority of the Council;

(d) Ensuring that in the utilization and recruitment of personnel preference be given to the indigenous people;

4. *Calls upon* the Government of South Africa to comply without delay with the terms of resolution 2145 (XXI) and the present resolution and to facilitate the transfer of the administration of the Territory of South West Africa to the Council;

5. *Requests* the Security Council to take all appropriate measures to enable the United

(Continued on page 114)

SOUTHERN AFRICA

(Continued from page 77)

with her so-called unilateral declaration of independence (popularly referred to as "U.D.I.").

In the face of this open defiance, Britain had an opportunity to intervene, but—here, as elsewhere, on the retreat from Asian and African conflicts—she did not do so. Nevertheless, as one observer pointed out, the entire white population of Rhodesia was so small that it could comfortably have been housed in, for example, the Scottish city of Dundee, so that a confrontation with Britain, especially one in which Britain enjoyed the support of the territory's four million Africans, need not have presented any insurmountable difficulties. Fearful, no doubt, of falling into a Conservative party trap, Britain's Labour government chose instead to impose sanctions—a face-saving device which has hurt the Rhodesian economy,⁶ and added some curious contretemps,⁷ but has not brought white Rhodesia to her knees. Instead, Britain has been blamed by many for her inaction, has seen nations such as Japan openly and repeatedly defy the embargo, and has also seen Rhodesia move slowly but steadily into South Africa's orbit until today she is, to all intents and purposes, part of South Africa.

This growing identity is shown not only in such ways as the improvement of communications between the two but also, and notably, in the open South African military support for the Rhodesian secessionist government against the African nationalist movement that, inevitably, has come into existence. Thus, in 1967, for the first time South African police and military forces entered Rhodesia

to assist in quelling sporadic guerrilla fighting. Still another step had been taken in moving away from past allegiances and toward the unifying of the internal organizational structure of the white fortress. Subsequent South African statements that South Africa would be fully justified in sending troops to help the Portuguese deal with guerrilla fighters in Angola and Mozambique indicate that it is not likely to be the last such step.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

What, then, is the future likely to hold? The prospects are not hopeful for any of the interests directly involved. These prospects might be summarized as follows:

(1) The United Nations is already committed to ending the Rhodesian rebellion and to establishing an independent South West African state free from apartheid. It may next attempt to achieve these goals by tightening the application of sanctions against the white coalition, perhaps by appointing a supervisory body. It is unlikely, however, to be effective until it has the backing of the major powers, who have not yet placed the question of Southern Africa high on their agendas.

(2) South Africa's luck, together with that of her partners, which has held for seven years, may soon run out. Settlement of other international problems could clear the way for a resurgence of interest in Southern Africa, an interest which might take forms not to the liking of the Vorster, Smith, or Salazar governments.⁸ Other factors favoring South Africa may also be modified. For example France, which now obtains uranium from South Africa, has avoided causing the coalition any embarrassment. However, in about 1970, when France begins to rely instead on recently discovered uranium deposits in Niger and the Equatorial African region, the political situation may also become modified. Furthermore, South Africa's metaphysical approach to the world is at variance with the twentieth century—television, for example, a dangerous agent of change, is banned by the South African government, whose minister of communications has declared it to be "evil." In the long run, however, the

⁶ White Rhodesian farmers, unable to sell or store large quantities of their tobacco, are now attempting to grow other crops.

⁷ After the United States, supporting the British and U.N. embargo on trading with Rhodesia, cut off its purchases of chrome from the territory, the People's Republic of China, finding its own supply of chrome from the Soviet Union cut off, purchased chrome directly from Rhodesia.

⁸ B. J. Vorster of South Africa; Ian Smith of Rhodesia; Oliveira Salazar of Portugal.

twentieth century is likely to break in rudely, disrupting forever the artificial atmosphere within the fortress.

(3) African nationalism is now suffering from evident weaknesses. However the guerrilla movement in Central Africa, like those in Algeria and Vietnam, is likely to gain in experience with the passage of time and to gain greater African support as well as material support from any outside interests who (for selfish reasons) oppose Southern Africa's white coalition. Or the situation may produce an unusual man—a twentieth-century African Toussaint Louverture—who will, by the strength of his personality, exert a decisive influence. Here again, however—for history has on occasion suddenly and unexpectedly produced such men under a variety of circumstances—it must also be recognized that he might just as well be a white South African as an African nationalist.

(4) The longer the conflict continues, the greater the danger that it will become an unadulterated race war, creating the gravest world-wide consequences. Among those who have warned against this danger are the late President John F. Kennedy, the late John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and British Prime Ministers Harold Wilson, Alexander Douglas-Home, and Harold Macmillan, not to speak of many more.

(5) The white coalition has repeatedly rejected the possibility of any form of peaceful change. At the same time, most outside interests directly involved—while not necessarily condoning South African attitudes—are not, at this stage, willing to face the consequences of effecting a change. The situation therefore seems bound to escalate on both sides until, at last, the conflict becomes so insupportable and disruptive that the outside world is obliged to intervene.

EAST AFRICA

(Continued from page 94)

ties have been announced. Refugee and religious leaders have been invited to tour the

south to see if conditions are back to normal and subsequently persuade their compatriots to return. In March, 1967, elections were held in the south to choose 34 representatives to the national parliament. Such efforts have not dissipated resentment among the refugees, but they have divided the nationalist leaders, because these efforts demand decisions about whether or not to cooperate with the authorities.

At present, the southern provinces are in a state of armed rebellion which shows little chance of abatement. Neither side appears willing to compromise, and their stated positions do not appear to be negotiable. However, the Sudanese government is spending nearly half its limited budget on the war, and about two-thirds of its 20,000-man army is deployed in the three provinces. They cannot sustain operations indefinitely just as the guerrillas cannot win militarily with their meager material and financial resources. A stalemate and long drawn-out war seem likely, barring massive outside intervention.

THE ENEMY'S ENEMY

One byproduct of these domestic and international conflicts has been an alignment of forces. Working on the thesis that my enemy's enemy is my friend, Kenya and Ethiopia are drifting closer together and Somalia and the Sudan are apparently firming relations. Perhaps the more advanced is the Ethiopia-Kenya axis since it was first formulated in July, 1963, by a military defense pact. Since then the two partners have conferred several times on defense matters and joint military operations against *shifita* have been conducted.

Sudanese-Somali cooperation is less developed, but their common religious zeal and common antagonists are beginning to draw the two together. In April and May, 1967, defense delegations were exchanged. Somali cadets now study at Sudanese army schools and agreements have been reached for the exchange of technical, cultural, military and other information.

Some of the disputes seem to be getting out of hand, economically and politically as well

as militarily. Some of the leaders in black Africa have nonetheless willingly sought to bring disputant governments closer to terms. Dissident minorities are harder to deal with than governments; yet leaders from third states can initiate talks without loss of face and political suicide. The resulting, initial agreements may serve as springboards for further, more significant agreements. The Somalia-Kenya accord at Kinshasa led to the Arusha Memorandum. Accords like the memorandum could well facilitate working agreements in specific problem areas in the relations between the parties to the dispute.

NIGERIA AT WAR

(Continued from page 71)

cited invasion; resenting the fact that no Ibo was safe in the North, they became involved in a war that destroyed the basis of Ibo security even in the South.

Although victory for the central forces seemed assured after the fall of Enugu, the war had not ended and the country's capacity for political compromise was virtually exhausted. Propaganda, by depicting complex human issues as moral confrontations, had hardened divisions. The federal coalition, a fragile structure of kaleidoscopic interests, was seen by the East as a merciless instrument of Muslim fanaticism. The Ibos, a frightened people seeking refuge from a searing communal experience, were pictured as a collection of inveterate troublemakers led by a "greedy, ambitious, reckless, boastful, pompous, determined and unpatriotic" demagogue.¹²

Such myths are inseparable from warfare, and would not be important if there were groups sufficiently detached to play the role of mediators. In Nigeria, divisions had become so deep that nobody could escape partisan identification. The army was split; so were the bureaucracy and the intellectual establishment. Politicians, once discredited, had been rehabilitated in order to exercise

their compromising skills. But, although their personal contacts facilitated communication across the gulf that army leaders could no longer bridge, they soon became too deeply enmeshed in the conflict to retain their claim to objectivity.

Eventually, by coercion or conciliation, hostilities will be ended, but the welcome return of peace will not end Nigeria's troubles. Territorial integrity may have been preserved, but national unity will be as remote as ever. Economic reconstruction may take only months; social reconstruction will take generations. Apart from the formidable task of reconciling Ibos to the political community, other difficulties are certain to emerge. The country has to face the problems of underdevelopment, and the federalist front, relieved of the immediate threat to its principles of action, will begin to reveal its inner contradictions: the far-reaching economic, political and administrative implications of the 12-state structure will have to be understood and solutions found to the many issues which it is bound to raise; the future of military rule will also have to be decided.¹³

One thing is clear. Nigeria, whose leadership has so often failed her in the past, is entering a phase of development likely to make even heavier demands on the quality of her leadership. She does so at a time when the existing leaders are exhausted and demoralized. The Nigerian conflict of 1967 may prove in retrospect, like the American Civil War, to have been a bitter prelude to a new national vision; but the obstacles to the realization of such a vision are formidable.

GHANA

(Continued from page 100)

During its early months, the N.L.C. gained support as the saviour of the country from despotism. Revulsion against the Nkrumah government—its corruption and inefficiency, its denial of basic political rights, its unresponsiveness to public opinion—provided a valuable cushion of support for the army and police officers. However, support based on

¹² *Towards One Nigeria* (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1967), p. 16.

¹³ Before the war, a scheme was worked out providing for a return to civilian rule by 1969, but presumably this timetable will have to be revised.

distaste for a previous regime cannot be expected to endure. Support must be built on a new basis. The Council is staking its claim on economic recovery. Ghana required extensive financial surgery—including amputation of state firms that only drained away resources. Yet many factors that affect the Ghanaian economy lie beyond the N.L.C.'s control. Foremost among these is the world market price for cocoa.

In the absence of effective international price arrangements, a bumper crop might drive down the funds Ghana would receive per ton, and thereby jeopardize the mainstay of the Ghanaian economy. Ghana's growing local industries require markets, particularly in Africa, but other states, anxious to develop their own industrial capacity, may be unwilling to enter into extensive trading relationships. Although the debt rescheduling provides an opportunity for reconstruction until early 1969, the creditor countries expect Ghana to repay thereafter according to the old schedules. In other words, she must expend nearly \$140 million in fiscal 1969–1970 for debt servicing, contrasted with \$14 million in the current fiscal year.

At the current time, Ghanaian politicians seem strangely muted. The symbolic participation in decision-making provided by the Political Advisory Committee has definite limitations. If the professions of a return to civilian rule are accurate, one should expect increasing tensions as the time of transition nears. Former supporters of Kwame Nkrumah will demand a share in governing. Ethnic tensions may intensify. The unhappy urban unemployed offer fertile ground for radical political appeals, for developing a style of leadership far removed from the conservative pragmatism of the N.L.C. Disaffected young elements of the armed forces may attempt, as did Lieutenant Arthur, to overthrow the regime and substitute a government of far different policies. The possibility of an implicit alliance of ex-Nkrumahist politicians, urban unemployed and junior officers, linked by their opposition to the well-educated former opposition politicians and senior officers comprising the Political Advisory Com-

mittee and the National Liberation Council, must not be overlooked.

It is easy to overthrow a despised regime: a few skirmishes, the seizure of main communications facilities, and the incarceration of the former leader's assistants usually suffice. Thus far, restoring civilian rule has proved infinitely more complex.

ETHIOPIA

(Continued from page 82)

interventions, the Emperor has acted impartially and with the best interests of Africa in mind. It is for these reasons that most Africans will watch with interest as the Emperor comes to grips with Ethiopia's looming internal problems. It is a paradox of history that many of these problems are of the Emperor's own making and reflect the measure of success he has achieved in unleashing the forces of reform and change in contemporary Ethiopia.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA

(Continued from page 110)

Nations Council for South West Africa to discharge the functions and responsibilities entrusted to it by the General Assembly;

6. *Requests* all States to extend their wholehearted co-operation and to render assistance to the Council in the implementation of its task;

V

Requests the Council to report to the General Assembly at intervals not exceeding three months on its administration of the Territory, and to submit a special report to the Assembly at its twenty-second session concerning the implementation of the present resolution;

VI

Decides that South West Africa shall become independent on a date to be fixed in accordance with the wishes of the people and that the Council shall do all in its power to enable independence to be attained by June 1968.

THE CONGO

(Continued from page 89)

more were mistreated and by September, Brussels made it clear that its entire aid program to the Congo was in jeopardy unless the Congo could offer guarantees of personal safety to Belgian technical assistance personnel. All the while, President Mobutu attempted to contain the dispute by focussing the blame on "some irresponsible Belgian circles" rather than on the Belgian government itself, while the latter attempted to maintain channels of communication open with Kinshasa. But the aftermath of the mercenaries' uprising continued to inflame tempers on both sides.

FATE OF THE MERCENARIES

The fate of the insurgents had in fact become a point of contention even before the rebellion had been ended. In September, 1967, when it had appeared that the mutineers could hold off Congolese army pressure for some time, the O.A.U., meeting in Kinshasa, had approved the principle of an internationally supervised withdrawal of the insurgents into Rwanda, to be followed by their evacuation to Europe (in the case of the mercenaries) or to Zambia, where the Kaunda government tentatively agreed to resettle the 950 Katangese soldiers and their 1,576 dependents. The International Red Cross Committee offered to arrange for this operation, but negotiations bogged down because both sides in turn felt that time was on their side. After the insurgents were driven from Bukavu, the Congo declared the whole evacuation scheme irrelevant, and demanded instead to have the leaders of the mutiny extradited from Rwanda—a move which received the backing of an *ad hoc* O.A.U. committee.

The bulk of the African mutineers were offered an amnesty and accepted repatriation, not (for understandable reasons) to their native Katanga, but to Northwestern Congo. As for the white mercenaries, President Mobutu demanded to have some sort of counterpart for the damage suffered by the Congo—either in the form of outright material

compensation to be offered by their respective governments, or at least in the form of some type of guarantee that they would never return to Africa. Predictably, the foreign governments against which these rather unusual demands were being made chose either to ignore them or to decline any responsibility for the actions of their respective nationals. Belgium, with the largest number of mercenaries involved in the uprising, was particularly sensitive on this subject and several Belgian newspapers again attacked Mobutu.

Despite these unpleasant side effects of the mutiny, the Mobutu regime, by the time of the celebration of its second anniversary, had reason to feel some satisfaction and confidence. It had given proof of its resiliency, weathered crises any one of which would probably have shipwrecked its predecessors, reestablished the Congo's position on the African diplomatic scene and received concrete proof of soft-spoken but steady United States support in its hour of need. At the same time, however, the mercenaries' murderous odyssey, while it certainly illustrated the futility of any attempts at white recolonization, also exposed the continuing vulnerability of the Congo (indeed, of most African countries) to outside interference. The lesson for Africa clearly was that as long as outside forces can stir up turmoil in Africa with a minimal outlay of men and money and with no serious risks to themselves, the temptation of intervention will continue to weigh on the destinies of Black Africa.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 106)

discusses "Nationalism and Imperialism" in the Communist world, and offers an informative historical perspective on the diversity of nationalities in that world. The contribution by Neil McInnes, an Australian journalist, deals with "The Labour Movement," and its relationship to the evolution of democratic socialism. There are also essays by Arnold Toynbee, Richard Lowenthal and Peter Wiles.

A.Z.R.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of December, 1967, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Dec. 11—At the final session of a 3-day conference of Arab foreign ministers in Cairo, delegates of 13 states agree that an Arab summit conference will be held on January 17, 1968, in Morocco.

Cyprus Dispute

Dec. 2—Greek Foreign Minister Panayotis Pipinelis formally announces that Turkey and Greece have reached agreement on a Cyprus settlement. The agreement calls for the withdrawal of all Greek and Turkish forces except for the 950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops provided for in the 1960 agreement giving independence to Cyprus. The position of the Cypriote President, Archbishop Makarios, is not clear.

Dec. 3—U.N. Secretary General U Thant asks Greece and Turkey to withdraw their forces from Cyprus. He also proposes increasing the function of the U.N. peacekeeping force in Cyprus.

The Greek government informs U Thant that it accepts his call for a troop withdrawal from Cyprus; Turkey has agreed to the withdrawal plea.

Dec. 4—Makarios, in a note responding to U Thant's peace appeal, asks the U.N. Security Council to guarantee Cyprus against military intervention.

Dec. 8—The first contingent of Greek soldiers (some 400) leaves Cyprus for Greece under the terms of the peace settlement.

Dec. 28—Turkish Cypriote leaders meet and appoint an 11-man Executive Council to exercise "jurisdiction over all Turks living in Turkish zones." Turkish officials attend the session.

Dec. 29—Makarios decries yesterday's Turk-

ish Cypriote action, saying it undermines agreements already made.

Greek officials declare the December 28 move an attempt to partition the island, creating a revival of the November, 1967, crisis.

Disarmament

Dec. 2—U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson offers to place all civilian and governmental nuclear facilities in the U.S. under inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, except those "with a direct national defense significance."

East African Community

Dec. 1—A 3-nation trade bloc of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is formally inaugurated, in a move to establish a form of common market.

East Europe

Dec. 21—Foreign ministers from 7 East European nations—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia—and from the Soviet Union end a 3-day meeting in Warsaw.

Dec. 22—A communiqué on the Middle East is issued following the 3-day meeting. The 3-page document upholds the right of Israel and the Arab states to live independently "in . . . security and peace."

European Economic Community

Dec. 19—France formally refuses to allow negotiations to begin on the question of British admission to the E.E.C. At a meeting of the Council of Ministers in Brussels, French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville vetoes negotiations with Britain.

International Monetary Crisis

Dec. 12—*The New York Times* reports that at the monthly meeting of the central bank

governors at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, over the past weekend, new policies to support the U.S. dollar and to curb gold trading were agreed on by the 7 financial powers that comprise the gold pool—Belgium, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, West Germany and the U.S. The U.S. Under Secretary of the Treasury, Frederick L. Deming, was present at the talks.

Dec. 14—According to *The New York Times*, the members of the “gold pool” have decided to place the gold pool on a more formal basis: members will deposit large amounts of gold with the pool and will receive a “bankbook” giving them a claim to the pool’s assets. The pool is committed to maintaining the price of gold at \$35 per ounce.

Dec. 15—*The New York Times* reports that gold purchases on the London market reached an estimated total of nearly \$300 million for the week.

A *New York Times* report states that the plan to make the gold pool a formal institution has been dropped.

Middle East Crisis

(See also *Intl, Arab League and East Europe*)

Dec. 8—According to *The New York Times*, yesterday Israeli forces flushed out an Arab terrorist base in the Israeli-occupied sector of Jordan.

Dec. 10—Israeli Labor Minister Yigal Allon, a member of a select group of ministers handling security problems, hints that Israel has missiles, declaring that “Every weapon Egypt can produce or purchase with the aid of a great power, we can match. . . .” Egypt has acquired Soviet missiles recently.

Dec. 12—In Cairo, informed sources report that U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser would agree to a demilitarized strip along the Israeli-Egyptian border, equal in size in Egyptian and Israeli territory. First, Israeli troops must evacuate the Sinai Peninsula.

Dec. 22—U.N. Secretary General U Thant

reports that the Security Council’s special representative to the Middle East, Gunnar V. Jarring, received the cooperation of Arabs and Israelis, in recent talks with Middle East leaders.

Dec. 24—The Egyptian government news agency reports that Ahmed Shukairy resigned today as head of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The executive committee of the organization chooses Yehia Hammouda as acting chairman. Shukairy’s resignation was demanded by other Palestinian leaders who accused him of being ineffectual and indiscreet.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(See also *Germany, Federal Republic of*)

Dec. 3—West German Lieutenant General Jurgen Benneck is appointed Commander in Chief of NATO forces in Central Europe.

Dec. 11—NATO’s military committee, in a special session, agrees to set up a multinational destroyer fleet under the allied command. To be called the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic, it will be available to NATO in peacetime.

Dec. 12—The defense ministers of 14 NATO countries approve the creation of the destroyer fleet. Rejecting the theory of massive retaliation against Soviet attack, the defense ministers agree on a new, 3-step, “flexible response.”

Organization of African Unity

Dec. 15—The President of Uganda, Milton Obote, opens a conference of African leaders in Kampala. The problem of white mercenaries in the Congo is discussed.

Organization of American States

Dec. 2—The Secretary General of the O.A.S., José A. Mora, discharges Luis Raul Betances as senior administrator of the O.A.S., following charges that Betances interfered on behalf of a candidate in elections for a new Secretary General last week. The election was inconclusive and must be held again.

Dec. 14—The O.A.S. Council agrees to post-

pone elections for a new Secretary General until February 12, 1968.

Dec. 28—Mora announces that Laurence W. Acker, a U.S. citizen, has been reinstated as Treasurer of the O.A.S. Secretariat and Director of its Offices of Financial Services.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Dec. 1—The 21 industrialized O.E.C.D. members agree to cut tariff duties temporarily on a non-reciprocal basis on manufactured and semi-manufactured goods imported from developing countries. Today's decision is made at a ministerial conference of the member states, and is given in the form of guidelines.

United Nations

(See also *Intl, Cyprus Dispute and Middle East Crisis*)

Dec. 6—In a pledging session at the General Assembly, 33 U.N. members pledge a total of over \$26 million for Arab refugees.

Dec. 8—By consensus, the Security Council agrees to permit U.N. Secretary General U Thant to increase the U.N. observer force in the Middle East.

Dec. 11—A declaration favoring birth control signed by U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson and 29 other heads of state is presented to U Thant.

U Thant advises the Security Council to renew the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping force in Cyprus.

Dec. 14—U Thant announces that the first major reorganization of his staff since 1955 will begin January 1, 1968.

Dec. 16—The General Assembly, voting 93-2, asks the Security Council to use its powers to force South Africa to yield her mandate over South West Africa. By a vote of 110-2, the General Assembly approves a resolution demanding that South Africa call off the trial of 37 South West African leaders being tried in Pretoria for "terrorism."

Dec. 19—The General Assembly votes, 115-0, to approve an agreement providing for the rescue and safe return of astronauts who

land on the high seas or in foreign countries.

Dec. 22—By a unanimous vote, the Security Council approves extending the peacekeeping force in Cyprus for 3 months more, until March 26, 1968.

War in Vietnam

(See also *Intl, U.N.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Dec. 2—*Hsinhua* (New China) press agency reports that China has protested the dive-bombing by U.S. planes of a Chinese freighter in the port of Hongay in North Vietnam on November 25. Eight crew members were wounded and the ship was damaged.

Dec. 4—A U.S. army spokesman in South Vietnam discloses that U.S. infantrymen of the mobile riverine force and South Vietnamese marines heavily defeated a Vietcong battalion in the Mekong Delta; 235 of its 300 men are killed.

Dec. 6—In Washington, government sources say that South Vietnamese police arrested a Vietcong agent supposedly seeking to deliver a message to U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker.

Dec. 8—The U.S. State Department issues a policy declaration to pacify the Saigon government's uneasiness over the U.S. willingness to permit the National Liberation Front (N.L.F.) to send representatives to debate the war at the U.N. Security Council. The statement asserts that the U.S. will not deal with the Vietcong without consulting South Vietnam and its other allies.

Dec. 15—U.S. planes bomb within 5 miles of Hanoi's center, and destroy a bridge.

Dec. 19—Speaking in a television interview at the White House, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson declares that U.S. bombing attacks will continue until there is evidence that a halt will be reciprocated by North Vietnam. Johnson also outlines a 5-point proposal: that fighting stop at the 17th parallel, the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam; that North Vietnam cease the infiltration of Laos; that North Vietnamese troops leave Laos; that

unity for Vietnam be open to negotiation; and that the government in South Vietnam be based on the principle of one man, one vote.

In Washington, it is reported that government officials privately estimate enemy strength in South Vietnam at from 418,000 to 483,000 men.

Dec. 21—The Hanoi radio announces that 2 U.S. B-52 bombers attacking North Vietnamese targets within the demilitarized zone were brought down by surface-to-air missiles. The U.S. denies the loss of any B-52 planes.

Dec. 23—President Johnson visits the U.S. base at Camranh Bay in South Vietnam.

Dec. 24—South Vietnamese and allied troops begin a 24-hour cease-fire for the Christmas holiday. The Vietcong begin a 3-day truce.

Dec. 26—*Nhan Dan*, North Vietnamese Communist party newspaper, rejects President Johnson's 5-point peace plan outlined on December 19. *The New York Times* reports that North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh, in a recent speech—his first public appearance in 4 months—urged that the fight against the U.S. be intensified.

Dec. 28—In Saigon, the U.S. command discloses that U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam has reached 478,000 men.

In Hanoi, *Agence France-Presse* reports that informed sources assert North Vietnam is ignoring South Vietnam's proposals for a return to the 1954 Geneva accords, as suggested by South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van Do. (See also *Vietnam, Republic of*.)

Dec. 30—In response to Pope Paul's appeal that New Year's Day be a day of peace, the South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry issues a communiqué announcing a 36-hour cease-fire, rather than the initial 24-hour observance.

Western European Union

Dec. 4—A report to the W.E.U.'s assembly session warns that the Western military situation in the Mediterranean has deteriorated, partly due to the French with-

drawal from NATO's integrated command and the increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean.

ALGERIA

Dec. 10—It is officially announced that 5 members of the Revolutionary Council and 1 cabinet member have "been called to other functions." The 6 officials have recently criticized President Houari Boumedienne's regime.

Dec. 15—Former army Chief of Staff Colonel Tahar Zbiri and dissident army units are foiled in an attempted coup d'etat. The official news agency charges that the revolt was financed by a foreign intelligence organization. Zbiri is said to have previously demanded the removal of several government ministers because they were gaining increased influence; he had also urged the convening of the 26-member Revolutionary Council. Boumedienne ignored his requests.

ARGENTINA

Dec. 4—It is learned that a Coordinating Committee of Solidarity with Monsignor Podestá has been formed by labor leaders and workers in reaction against Podestá's forced resignation as Bishop of Avellaneda, a Buenos Aires suburb. Podestá, who is noted for his progressivism and support of the workers, announced on December 2 that the Papal Nuncio asked him to resign as Bishop on November 1. Vatican sources have denied that the Argentine government asked for his resignation.

AUSTRALIA

Dec. 17—Prime Minister Harold Holt disappears while swimming off Cheviot Beach in Victoria.

Dec. 19—Following a 2-day search, Holt is officially presumed dead; Minister for Trade and Industry John McEwen is sworn in as interim prime minister.

Dec. 22—Memorial services for Holt are held in Melbourne at St. Paul's Cathedral; the services are attended by many world leaders, including U.S. President Lyndon Johnson.

BOLIVIA

Dec. 2—It is reported that the mountain town of La Higuera, where the Bolivian army captured and executed Cuban revolutionary leader Ernesto "Che" Guevara, has been placed out of bounds for all visitors.

BRAZIL

Dec. 29—The Brazilian Central Bank announces that on January 4, 1968, the *cruzeiro* will be devalued by 16 per cent.

CAMBODIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Dec. 21—Following reports from Washington indicating that South Vietnamese troops may pursue Vietcong forces into Cambodia, the Cambodian government warns that its armed forces and all civilians will fight if Cambodia is invaded.

Dec. 30—Chief of State Norodom Sihanouk's spokesmen confirm yesterday's *Washington Post* report that Sihanouk will allow U.S. forces to pursue North Vietnamese regulars and Vietcong forces into Cambodia.

CANADA

Dec. 6—Following yesterday's disclosure of a government report calling for official equality for the French language as part of an effort to preserve the 100-year-old Canadian confederation, Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson wins parliamentary support for the report's recommendations.

Dec. 12—Trade Minister Robert Winters announces that the government has concluded an agreement with Communist China for the sale of 2 million tons of wheat.

Dec. 14—Pearson reports that he will soon retire as prime minister; he also submits his resignation as head of the Liberal party.

Dec. 19—The House of Commons overwhelmingly approves a bill to liberalize the grounds for divorce.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

(See also *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

Dec. 2—*Agence France-Presse* reports that 5 Communist party Central Committee

delegates, sent to Fukien Province to investigate recent riots, have been arrested by revolutionary rebels.

Dec. 6—U.S. navy sources claim China has equipped her 2 largest submarines with launchers for nuclear-tipped missiles.

Dec. 21—Persons returning to Hong Kong from the Canton Trade Fair report that violent fighting has erupted in Kwangtung Province between anti-Maoist rebels and political and military authorities.

Dec. 23—The government grants Pakistan a \$40-million, interest-free loan.

Dec. 24—The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission reports that China has conducted her 7th nuclear test, in a northwest province; apparently the explosion had a force of less than 20 kilotons.

Hsinhua, the official press agency, claims that 2 U.S. ships and 1 plane violated Chinese borders yesterday.

Dec. 25—Wall posters in Peking report peasant riots supported by some military units in at least 5 provinces.

CUBA

Dec. 6—The first flight to take U.S. citizens out of Cuba since December, 1966 (when Premier Fidel Castro halted repatriations) lands at the Mexican border town of Matamoros with 71 persons, who are taken by bus to Brownsville, Texas.

Dec. 21—In an interview with Castro published today, Castro admits that Cuba and the Soviet Union disagree because of Cuba's support for guerrilla activities in Latin America.

CYPRUS

(See *Intl, Cyprus Dispute*)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(See also *Intl, East Europe*)

Dec. 19—Climaxing a political struggle which began 2 months ago when President Antonin Novotny's leadership was challenged by 3 Presidium members, Novotny calls for a meeting tomorrow of the Communist party's Central Committee to procure permission to act as party and state leader for "a few more months."

According to a *New York Times* report, Soviet Communist party chief Leonid Brezhnev arrived in Prague on December 8 to intervene on Novotny's behalf during turbulent Presidium meetings.

Dec. 27—The West German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine* states that Novotny has offered to resign, but that a schism in the party is precluding the choice of a successor.

DAHOMY

Dec. 14—According to reports in the Paris newspaper *Le Monde*, all communications out of Dahomey were cut December 13 and the army and police now hold strategic areas of the capital (Cotonou), following yesterday's strikes protesting the government's austerity program.

Dec. 17—Major Maurice Kouandete announces the overthrow of President Christophe Soglo's 2-year-old regime and says that a military revolutionary committee, chaired by himself, will set up a provisional government. The committee promises a new constitution and a referendum in 6 months.

Dec. 18—Kouandete forms a 10-man cabinet to act as the provisional government. Kouandete will be head of the regime as well as minister of defense and of information.

Dec. 20—Approximately 300 trade union leaders hold a public meeting with government officials and reach an accord providing for a committee to investigate ways of meeting the unions' various demands.

DENMARK

Dec. 15—Premier Jens Otto Krag resigns and calls for new elections on January 23. His government fell earlier today because of a 92-85 parliamentary vote rejecting a bill to freeze wages.

FRANCE

(See also *Intl, E.E.C.*)

Dec. 7—Informed French sources disclose that the government will soon lift its arms embargo against Iraq and other Arab states not involved in the June, 1967, Arab-Israeli war. They report that the arms embargo

against the belligerents will continue. In exchange for weapons, France is to gain a favored position in the exploration and development of Iraqi oil.

Dec. 8—According to "authorized sources" quoted by *Agence France-Presse*, all military equipment ordered by Israel has been delivered. However, Mirage V supersonic fighter-bombers will not be delivered to Israel or to any other Middle East nation.

Dec. 15—President Charles de Gaulle and the Syrian delegation that arrived December 10 issue a joint communiqué, calling for increased "economic, technical and cultural cooperation."

GABON

Dec. 2—Vice President Albert Bernard Bongo is sworn in as President, succeeding Léon Mba, who died on November 28 after an illness.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See also *Intl, NATO; U.S.S.R.*)

Dec. 5—Minister of Defense Gerhard Schröder urges retention of a nuclear-weapons capability by West German military units integrated into NATO.

Dec. 7—Chairman of the extreme right-wing National Democratic party Adolf von Thadden announces his party's decision to form the Guard Society Against Opinion Terror. The "SG" is to protect party meetings against "fearful tumults fomented" by anti-party demonstrators. Thadden says that "common blood, language and history" are basic elements of the German people.

Dec. 9—Minister for All-German Affairs Herbert Wehner warns his country against a rebirth of chauvinist and extremist groups. He calls the National Democratic party "anti-democratic."

Dec. 13—Foreign Minister Willy Brandt receives cabinet authorization to negotiate the resumption of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia "without preconditions."

Dec. 22—The West German embassy in Moscow delivers a note from Bonn to the Soviet

Foreign Ministry, rejecting Soviet charges of neo-Nazism in Germany.

GREECE

(See also *Intl, Cyprus Dispute*)

Dec. 13—King Constantine, his family and Premier Constantine Kollias fly to Rome from the Larissa military base after the King's attempted counter-coup fails. Earlier today, Constantine broadcast a proclamation dismissing the junta and calling for support from the people.

In Athens, the junta names Lieutenant General George Zoitakis as "viceroy"; it claims victory after most units of the military rally to its side; Colonel George Papadopoulos is appointed Premier and Defense Minister.

Dec. 14—The ambassadors of Italy, France, the U.S., Britain and West Germany do not respond to the junta's invitation to meet with Papadopoulos; no other governments extend recognition to the regime.

Dec. 16—With a mandate from the junta, Archbishop Ieronymos Kotsonis, the Greek Orthodox Primate, meets in Rome with Constantine. He is said to have presented the King with 5 conditions for his return to his throne. The King presents counter-proposals.

Dec. 20—It is reported from Athens by informed sources that approximately 1,800 officers are being detained by the junta for questioning about their role in the abortive coup.

The King asks the junta for a "firm and complete timetable" for the reinstatement of democratic procedures as a condition for his return.

Papadopoulos retires from his army post.

Dec. 21—Publisher Helen Vlachos, under house arrest since October, flees to London.

Dec. 22—Papadopoulos announces that a new constitution will be submitted to the Greeks in 1968; however, free elections will be indefinitely delayed.

Dec. 23—The regime declares a Christmas amnesty for most of the country's 2,500 political prisoners, including Andreas Papandreou (son of former Premier George

Papandreou), and lifts house arrest orders on former premiers Panayotis Canelopoulos and Papandreou. At the same time, Papadopoulos announces a plebiscite to be held on April 21, 1968.

GUATEMALA

Dec. 5—The National Electoral Registry reports that in the December 3 elections the ruling Revolutionary party won municipal elections in 20 of the 31 contested municipalities.

INDIA

Dec. 1—Siddhavanahalli Nijalingappa, Chief Minister of Mysore, accepts the nomination to become the next president of the Congress party.

Dec. 8—Leader of Kashmir's Muslims Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah is released after a 20-month detention by the government. He is prohibited from making public statements and going to Kashmir.

Opposition to a parliamentary bill seeking to retain English as an official national language continues for a 7th day. Students have been rioting throughout the state of Uttar Pradesh.

Dec. 9—Sheik Abdullah decides he will not accept the government's order releasing him because it contains too many restrictions.

Anti-English language demonstrators force Delhi University to close.

Dec. 13—Voting 224 to 75, the lower house of Parliament approves the bill retaining English as a national language, until the states presently opposing Hindi accept it as the national language.

Dec. 20—Parliament gives the government sweeping powers to forbid any organization or individual to criticize India's sovereignty over any of her territory.

Dec. 25—The government relaxes its restrictions on Abdullah's release order, allowing him to address public meetings; the sheik does not accept the new conditional offer.

IRAQ

(See also *France*)

Dec. 24—Iraq and the Soviet Union sign an

agreement allowing the Soviets to aid development of oil deposits in southern Iraq.
Dec. 26—President Abdel Rahman Arif blames the Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company for sabotaging one of its own pipelines on December 1.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Dec. 3—The cabinet chooses a new chief of staff, Brigadier General Chaim Bar-Lev, to replace Major General Itzhak Rabin, who is to be ambassador to the U.S.

Dec. 13—Former Premier David Ben-Gurion's Rafi party votes to reunite with Premier Levi Eshkol's Mapai party. Ben-Gurion has opposed the merger.

Dec. 19—Minister of Commerce and Industry Zeev Sharef discloses that Israel and Rumania today agreed to set up joint industrial projects provided for in an economic, scientific and technical pact signed by the 2 governments in April, 1967.

IVORY COAST

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

LAOS

Dec. 13—Some 400 North Vietnamese regulars and Pathet Lao guerrillas attack a government command headquarters at Lao Ngam (southern Laos), precipitating the 1st major battle in 6 months.

Dec. 26—Acting as defense minister, Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma issues a communiqué charging that North Vietnamese troops have attacked government positions in the southern tip of Laos.

MEXICO

Dec. 1—Voting results are published indicating that the Revolutionary Institutional party, dominant in Mexican politics for 3 decades, has lost 3 election contests in the Yucatan state capital, Mérida.

PANAMA

Dec. 1—Four political parties and a segment of a 5th have deserted the 8-party coalition government of President Marco A. Robles. They have switched their allegiance to Annulfo Arias, a presidential can-

didate in the upcoming May 12, 1968, elections.

PORTUGAL

Dec. 14—It is revealed in Lisbon that Mario Soares, leader of the democratic (Socialist) opposition, has been jailed on undisclosed charges.

Dec. 27—Premier Antonio de Oliveira Salazar's government introduces an expansionary budget of \$781.7 million—a 10 per cent budget increase; 37 per cent of the budget is earmarked for defense and security.

RUMANIA

(See also *Israel*)

Dec. 8—A national conference of the Rumanian Communist party votes to establish 40 to 45 counties, eliminating the predominantly Hungarian Magyar Autonomous Region in Transylvania, as well as Rumania's 16 other regions. The reform was announced December 6.

Dec. 9—Acting on a suggestion by the General Secretary of the Communist party, Nicolae Ceausescu, the Grand National Assembly elects him Chairman of the State Council, chief of state. Emil Bodnares becomes Vice President. Other old-time party regulars are shifted to positions of less responsibility.

Dec. 15—After 2 days of talks in Moscow, Ceausescu leaves; a joint communiqué reveals no end to the Rumanian-Soviet rift.

SOUTH YEMEN, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

Dec. 1—The new government appoints Ali Mohamed Hasson governor of the 5 small Kuria Muria Islands and of the Perim and Kamaran islands. (The islands were ceded to Britain by the Sultan of Oman in 1854.)

The government appoints an 11-man cabinet; it will be presided over by President Qahtan al-Shaabi without a premier.

It is reported from Aden that Britain has decided to hand over the Kuria Muria Islands to the sultanate of Muscat and Oman.

Dec. 3—Foreign Minister Saif Shali declares South Yemen's right to employ "all possible

means" to regain the Kuria Muria Islands.

SPAIN

Dec. 12—In a decision made public in Madrid today, the Supreme Court declares that all labor strikes are illegal "in principle." The decision marks a change in the generally accepted Spanish view that economically motivated strikes are legally permissible.

SWITZERLAND

Dec. 14—Foreign Minister Willy Spühler, a Social Democrat, is elected Swiss President at a joint session of both houses of Parliament. Spühler will remain Foreign Minister.

THAILAND

Dec. 1—The government decrees martial law in 5 central and southern provinces in an attempt to stem an apparently growing Communist terrorist movement.

Dec. 2—The government accuses 4 U.S. publications (*The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Washington Star* and *The Nation*) of "malicious and scandalous" reports declaring Thailand is sending mercenaries to Vietnam in exchange for U.S. Hawk missiles. The government claims the missiles are necessary to offset the dangers which can emanate from a U.S. military presence in Thailand.

TURKEY

(See *Intl, Cyprus Dispute*)

U.S.S.R., THE

(See also *West Germany* and *Iraq*)

Dec. 2—Moscow and London agree to open direct flight service between Britain and the U.S.S.R., beginning in the spring.

The Foreign Trade Ministry announces that foreign business companies will be allowed to open permanent offices in the Soviet Union on an experimental basis.

Dec. 8—The government issues a statement to West Germany calling for an end to the rebirth of Nazism, and demanding that West Germany renounce her claims to West Berlin and to territories ceded to Poland after World War II.

Dec. 10—A statement issued by *Tass*, the official press agency, declares that the U.S. intends to send troops into Cambodia and Laos; it warns that the "Soviet Union proceeds from the belief that all states must respect the independence and neutrality of [these 2 nations]. . . ."

Dec. 12—Ending a 4-day visit by East German Chief of State Walter Ulbricht, the Soviet Union and East Germany issue a joint communiqué denouncing West German "aggressiveness" and urging a consolidation of the Warsaw Pact.

Dec. 16—According to sources in Cairo, 6 Soviet naval ships arrive in Alexandria; there are now 8 Soviet warships there.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, THE

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

UNITED KINGDOM, THE

Dec. 14—Prime Minister Harold Wilson tells the House of Commons that the British embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa is still in effect; it was imposed in 1964.

Dec. 18—An emergency cabinet meeting agrees to reject an arms order from South Africa and pledges a general cut in public spending; further, the cabinet agrees to a cut in overseas military commitments.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

(See also *Military*)

Dec. 4—Civil rights leader Martin Luther King reveals plans for a massive campaign of nonviolent civil disobedience in Washington in 1968 to force the Administration and Congress to provide "jobs or income for all."

Dec. 6—President Lyndon Johnson invites 6 Americans to form a board of directors for an Institute for Urban Development to study urban problems.

Dec. 29—In Jackson, Mississippi, 7 men are sentenced to 3-to-10-year federal prison terms. The men were convicted in October, 1967, for the slaying of 3 civil rights workers in Mississippi in 1964.

The Economy

Dec. 6—After 6 steel companies reveal price-

- rise plans, President Johnson urges industrialists to hold the line on price increases.
- Dec. 7—The Treasury announces that the nation's gold reserves dropped \$475 million in the course of the speculation in gold that followed Britain's devaluation of the pound. (See *Intl, Monetary Crisis, Current History*, January, 1968, p. 55.)
- Dec. 13—Budget Bureau Director Charles L. Schultze announces that the federal government has adopted a new form of the budget to be presented to Congress early in 1968, eliminating the 3 sets of budget figures previously submitted.
- Dec. 16—The U.S. says it "stands firm" in its promise to maintain the price of gold at \$35 an ounce; it is supported by the central banks of Belgium, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
- Dec. 27—The Federal Reserve Board "freezes" some \$550 million in lendable funds, by increasing bank reserve requirements by one-half of 1 per cent.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Disarmament, and War in Vietnam; Cambodia*)

- Dec. 5—Cyrus Vance, the President's special envoy to Cyprus, meets with the President on his return to Washington.
- Dec. 7—In a recorded radio interview, Vice President Hubert Humphrey declares that a compromise government in Saigon might rise out of a split between the Communists and non-Communists in the National Liberation Front (N.L.F.), political arm of the Vietcong.
- U.S. Representative to the U.N. Arthur J. Goldberg declares that in September the N.L.F. made inquiries about sending representatives as public spokesmen to the U.N., but failed to follow through on the inquiry.
- Dec. 11—The State Department reaffirms the U.S. willingness "to assist materially" to try to make the International Control Commission for Cambodia more effective "as a means of protecting the integrity and neutrality of Cambodia."
- Dec. 13—In Washington, government sources

admit that the U.S. is studying plans to allow its field commanders in Vietnam to engage in "hot pursuit" of the enemy into Cambodia.

- Dec. 15—In a speech to the Senate at its closing session, Senator John Sherman Cooper (D., Ky.) asks the President not to extend the war into Laos or Cambodia.
- Dec. 19—The President leaves for Australia to attend memorial services for Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt.
- Dec. 20—The U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington rules that under existing legislation the Department of State cannot refuse to issue passports to citizens who might travel to Albania, Communist China, Cuba, North Korea and North Vietnam.
- Dec. 21—In Australia, President Johnson confers with South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu; a joint communiqué reaffirms the South Vietnamese government's willingness to discuss "relevant matters" with persons "associated with the N.L.F." The Thieu government refuses to recognize the N.L.F. in any sense as an independent organization, but will meet with persons who have "defected" from the N.L.F.
- Dec. 22—Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.) confirms the fact that his committee is looking into the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident.
- Dec. 23—In Rome, President Johnson talks with Pope Paul VI about the war in Vietnam.
- Dec. 24—In a Christmas greeting to the nation, the President pledges to try "any reasonable route to negotiations" to end the war in Vietnam, on his return after a 27,000-mile, 112-hour journey around the world.
- Dec. 26—A \$40.1-million food for peace agreement with Pakistan is announced.
- The U.S. tells Cambodia it has no "hostile intentions" toward Cambodian territory.
- Dec. 27—The Department of State reveals its concern that Communist military pres-

tures are building up in Laos, Cambodia and Thailand; it makes public a December 4 note from the U.S. to Cambodia expressing concern over the enemy's use of Cambodian territory and offering American help to cope with the problem.

Dec. 28—In Washington, State Department officials describe "a new diplomatic initiative" to gain international support to strengthen international supervision of Cambodia's neutrality. Officials say that they plan to give documented evidence to interested nations that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese are using Cambodia as a staging base for military operations.

Dec. 30—Beginning a 13-day trip to 8 central African nations, Vice President Hubert Humphrey arrives in the Ivory Coast. He tells President Félix Houphouët-Boigny the U.S. Export-Import Bank has approved a \$36.5-million construction loan for a hydroelectric project.

Dec. 31—According to a *New York Times* article by Henry Raymont, Régis Debray (the French Marxist, serving a 30-year sentence for guerrilla activities) wrote a letter to friends claiming that in April, 1967, when he was nearly shot to death by the Bolivian army, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency probably intervened to save his life.

Government

Dec. 4—President Johnson names Indianapolis lawyer James M. Nicholson to the 5-man Federal Trade Commission, succeeding John R. Reilly.

The White House reveals that Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Foy D. Kohler is retiring; Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. Ambassador to France, is to replace him.

Dec. 5—President Johnson signs the \$589-million federal health aid bill; the aid, which is to be spread over the next 3 years, includes \$40 million for rat extermination.

Dec. 6—The White House receives a bill providing for the establishment of a federal judicial center to modernize the U.S. court system.

Dec. 8—A \$2.09-billion appropriation bill for military construction projects is signed by the President.

Dec. 10—The House Committee on Un-American Activities publicizes its report on the Ku Klux Klan; it says that the K.K.K. remains a terrorist conspiracy.

Dec. 11—Congress completes action on a bill authorizing \$1.98 billion for the anti-poverty program for the 1968 fiscal year. The two-year authorization figure is set at \$4.16 billion.

Dec. 15—Before adjourning, Congress passes a \$9.3-billion 2-year aid to elementary and secondary education bill; an omnibus social security bill providing increased social security taxes and increases of at least 13 per cent in pension checks for some 24 million persons, plus stricter regulations on aid to dependent children; a \$2.29-billion appropriation for foreign aid, smallest in the 20 years of the program and almost \$1 billion under the Administration's request; and a final appropriations bill including \$1.77 billion to finance the antipoverty program in fiscal 1968.

President Johnson signs a bill requiring states with more than 1 representative in the House of Representatives to elect its representatives in districts rather than in statewide elections; New Mexico and Hawaii are specifically excepted until after the 1968 elections.

The President signs the Wholesome Meat Act, which will gradually extend federal inspection standards to all meat packing and processing plants.

Dec. 16—President Johnson signs the \$5.4-billion federal pay rise bill, and the postal rate increase bill, raising 1st class mail from 5¢ to 6¢, postcards from 4¢ to 5¢ and domestic airmail from 8¢ to 10¢ an ounce, effective January 7. The bill also prohibits congressmen from adding relatives to their office payrolls.

Acting under the Trade Expansion Act, the President signs a proclamation putting the first Kennedy-Round tariff reductions

into effect January 1. The tariff reductions apply to nearly 6,000 items, and over a 5-year period will reach an average 35 per cent cut in 5 installments.

Dec. 19—Twenty-one government agencies promise to stop providing secret funds for academic research on foreign countries. Research in the field of the natural sciences is not covered by the pledge, which applies to funds provided by many government agencies, including the Department of Defense, the largest contractor. The extent of secret funding has not been disclosed, but the new guidelines are the result of a State Department inquiry triggered by criticism in 1965 over the Army's funding of the project Camelot, a multimillion dollar study of the sociology of rebellion in underdeveloped countries.

The Interstate Commerce Commission elects Paul J. Tierney as chairman, succeeding William H. Tucker.

Dec. 27—The President signs a bill strengthening police powers to make arrests and question suspects in the District of Columbia.

Dec. 29—Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Robert J. McCloskey reveals that secret government funding operations for private and educational organizations will terminate December 30.

Labor

Dec. 11—At the annual A.F.L.-C.I.O. convention, the A.F.L.-C.I.O. votes overwhelmingly to support the President's policies in Vietnam. President of the United Automobile Workers Walter P. Reuther (who has refused to attend the convention because of a disagreement with A.F.L.-C.I.O. President George Meany) has opposed the war in Vietnam. Meany is reelected for a 2-year term.

Dec. 12—President Johnson addresses the A.F.L.-C.I.O. convention.

Dec. 15—The United Automobile Workers and the General Motors Corporation agree on a new contract, avoiding a major strike; local strikes are still possible.

Military Policy

Dec. 4—President Johnson names Lieutenant General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., as Marine Commandant, succeeding General Wallace M. Greene, Jr.

Dec. 9—Attorney General Ramsay Clark and Lieutenant General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of Selective Service, declare that draft registrants who are involved in "lawful protest activities" against the war in Vietnam will not suffer cancellation of their deferments; illegal obstructors of the draft will face all penalties provided by law.

Dec. 19—In Washington, informed sources reveal that American pilots are now permitted to fly through the buffer strip along the Chinese border and the outer 20-mile circle around Hanoi on their way to attack targets outside the restricted zones.

Dec. 23—Following his attendance at Australian Prime Minister Holt's funeral, President Johnson pays a surprise visit to Camranh Bay, South Vietnam, after a stop at the U.S. air base at Korat, Thailand.

Dec. 26—Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara orders apartment houses near the Pentagon that discriminate against Negroes off-limits as dwellings to all servicemen, effective January 15, 1968.

Politics

Dec. 6—In an interview, Senator Eugene J. McCarthy (D., Minn.) says he will not decide at this time whether he will support the Democratic party candidate for the presidency in 1968. McCarthy will run as an anti-Administration candidate in at least 5 Democratic primaries.

Dec. 8—New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller declines to rule out the possibility that he will accept a Republican request that he be the Republican presidential candidate in 1968.

Science and Space

Dec. 10—In New Mexico, the world's first commercial thermonuclear explosion is successfully completed. Project Gasbuggy is

the initial test in the Plowshare program to work out peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Supreme Court

Dec. 4—In an unsigned order, the Supreme Court announces it will rule on the issue of whether suburban housing developments must be open to all on an equal basis regardless of race.

The Court affirms a statewide school desegregation order leveled against Alabama's Democratic Governor Lurleen Wallace and the state's education officials.

Dec. 5—Ruling 8 to 1, the Court says that unions have a constitutional right to set up "group legal service" providing free or low cost legal aid to union members.

The Court rules 8 to 0 that the state of Florida may not disqualify laid-off workers from unemployment benefits because the workers have filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board.

Dec. 11—In a 6-2 decision, the Court declares that laws that violate individual rights may be declared unconstitutional despite the fact that they may be designed to protect "the national defense." A provision of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 making it a crime for a Communist party member to work in a defense plant is declared unconstitutional.

Dec. 18—Confirming without comment the May 10, 1967, decision of a 3-judge federal district court, the Court rules that in effect New York congressional districts must be reapportioned before the 1968 elections.

The Court rules 7 to 1 that the Constitution does not rule out electronic bugging by law enforcement officers if they hold warrants authorizing their action. Warrants are required by police officers even if they eavesdrop in semi-public places, according to the Court. Whether or not physical trespass is involved is no longer to be the decisive factor.

URUGUAY

Dec. 6—The President of Uruguay, General Oscar Daniel Gestido, dies of a heart at-

tack. Vice President Jorge Pacheco Areco is sworn in as President.

VATICAN

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Dec. 23—Pope Paul VI offers to mediate in the Vietnamese war and asks for peace without victory.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

Dec. 26—The South Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Tran Van Do, in an interview with *Agence France-Presse* in Paris, declares that his government is trying to arrange "direct" talks between Hanoi and Saigon.

YEMEN

Dec. 14—Informed sources in Washington report that the Soviet Union has been airlifting military aid to the Yemeni republican regime fighting the royalists.

Dec. 18—Major General Hassan al-Amri, commander of the armed forces, is chosen by the Presidency Council to form a war cabinet. Earlier, the Council accepted Premier Mohsan al-Aini's resignation.

Reports from Cairo indicate the Yemeni republican government is no longer assured that it has won the 5-year battle with royalist forces and is preparing for a protracted struggle.

Dec. 23—Cairo radio reports that a 16-man cabinet has been named by Premier Hassan al-Amri.

Dec. 27—Abdul Rahman al-Iryani, Chairman of the Presidency Council, says he would like to meet with Saudi Arabian King Faisal to discuss and settle the differences between their countries.

YUGOSLAVIA

Dec. 28—The government refuses to attend the all-Communist party conference in Budapest on February 28, 1968.

PRINTED BY BUSINESS
PRESS, INCORPORATED

